tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10308151071478415112024-03-13T09:55:59.954-05:00US Cuba NormalizationJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.comBlogger195125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-41211315652094849542012-11-24T19:28:00.002-05:002012-11-24T19:36:23.313-05:00Excerpts from suit by Alan and Judy Gross<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="font-family: LiberationSans, sans-serif;">Case
1:12-cv-01860-JEB Document 2 Filed 11/16/12</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;">ALAN
GROSS... </span>and JUDITH GROSS, Plaintiffs, v.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">DEVELOPMENT
ALTERNATIVES, INC., and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b>COMPLAINT<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">
</span></b><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">(excerpts)</span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">since December 3,
2009. Mr. Gross is imprisoned in Cuba due to his work on a project
that Defendant United States </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><u>negligently
directed, organized, and oversaw</u></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">
(pp 1-2)</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>Worse,
Defendant DAI, with negligence, gross negligence and willful
disregard for </i></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">Plaintiffs’
rights, failed to take these basic remedial steps because doing so
would have delayed </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">or
prevented DAI’s complete performance under part of a lucrative
contract with Defendant </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">United
States, thereby depriving Defendant DAI of significant revenue.
Indeed, upon </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">information
and belief, Defendant DAI’s business model depends upon obtaining
and performing </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">contracts
with Defendant United States. Defendant DAI engaged in this behavior
– </span><u style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">putting profits before safety </u><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">– (pp 2-3)</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">21.
USAID’s “Cuba Democracy and Contingency Planning Program” (the
“Cuba </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">Program”)
was developed pursuant to the Helms-Burton Act. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">22.
USAID’s Cuba Program was “expressly designed to hasten Cuba’s
peaceful </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">transition
to a democratic society.” Task Order No. DFD-I-03-00250-00 (“Cuba
Task Order”) at </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: small;">B.1.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: xx-small;">1
</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: small;">One of its objectives is to “[d]evelop and . .
. </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: small;"><u>activate plans for launching a
rapid-response </u></span><u style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">programmatic
platform that will meet USAID’s interest for having and
coordinating an on-island </u><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><u>presence.</u></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">”
</span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>Id.
(p 9)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>66.
The Subcontract stated that “[t]he pilot [project] will diminish
portions of the </i></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">information blockage by – on a limited test basis – establishing internet
connections using </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">multiple
redundant devices in order to improve intra and intergroup
communications channels. </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">The
pilot will . . . [e]nable target beneficiaries via training to use
ICT devices to connect to the </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">internet
so that they can have regular and direct contact with each other and
with JBDC, </span><u style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">as well </u><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><u>as
enable access to a large volume [of] data and information not
previously accessed</u></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">
. . . .”</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>
(p 18)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>74.
Upon information and belief, </i><i><u>USAID, and the United States’
diplomatic mission in </u></i></span></span><u style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">Cuba,
were required to communicate with each other regularly</u><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"> regarding
Mr. Gross’ trips to </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">Cuba.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">75.
Upon information and belief, Mr. Gross was not provided with the same </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">information
that Defendants USAID and DAI possessed regarding the specific risks
involved in </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">performing
this kind of project in Cuba.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>
(p 19)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>76.
As discussed further below, Defendants DAI and United States breached
their duty </i></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">to
protect Mr. Gross from specific risks that Defendants, based on their
position, had the unique </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">ability
to know. Defendants also ignored Mr. Gross’ own expressions of
concern about the </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">Project,
opting instead to continue an operation from which </span><u style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">Defendant DAI
stood to benefit </u><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><u>financially
and that Defendant United States was committed to ideologically</u></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>
(p 20)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>83.
Instead, Defendant United States continued, without any adjustment,
the Cuba ICT </i></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">Project,
</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><u>using
Mr. Gross as a pawn in its overall Cuban policy efforts</u></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>
(P21)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>91.
A failure by Mr. Gross to complete the work would have jeopardized
not only the </i></span></span><u style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">millions
of dollars owed to DAI by USAID on the Cuba Task Order</u><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">, but, upon
information and </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">belief,
also would have jeopardized other existing, and future, business
generally between DAI </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">and
USAID.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>
(p22)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>102.
In his fourth trip memorandum, Mr. Gross began his section on risk
with the </i></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: small;">following
sentence in bold lettering: “In no uncertain terms, this is very
</span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>risky
</i></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: small;">business.” To </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">illustrate
the risks involved, he described </span><u style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">an incident during which Cuban
customs officials </u><u style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">attempted
to seize some of his team’s equipment when they arrived at the
airport in Havana. </u><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">Fourth
Trip Memo. at 5. He described efforts by Cuban authorities to detect
or “sniff out” </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: small;">wireless
networks and other unauthorized radio frequency use, especially
outside of Havana. . He reiterated that the</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: small;"><u>
detection of these networks could result in arrests of his contacts
there.</u></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: small;">
</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif; font-size: small;"><i>(pp
23-24)</i></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>117.
Notwithstanding the verdict by the Cuban court, Mr. Gross’
activities were entirely </i></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">lawful
under the laws of the United States.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>
(p 26)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>129.
Mr. and Mrs. Gross likewise have suffered significant economic losses
due to Mr. </i></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">Gross’s
wrongful arrest and continuing wrongful detention.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>
(p 30)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>139.
</i><i><u>Defendant United States’ breaches of its duties were a
direct and proximate cause </u></i></span></span><u style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">of
Mr. Gross’ detention and imprisonment in Cuba</u><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"> and the injuries
and damages suffered as a </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">result.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>
(p 32)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>152.
</i><i><u>Defendant DAI’s breaches of its duties were a direct and
proximate cause of Mr. </u></i></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><u>Gross’
detention and imprisonment in Cuba and the injuries and damages
suffered as a result</u></span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;">.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>
(p 34)</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>for
full text of the Complaint, download from here </i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><br /></i></span></span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6Mo1c2bIFLWUGtILWlhdWRIZXM/edit?pli=1</i></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>or
go to </i></span></span>
</div>
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<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><br /></i></span></span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i>http://alongthemalecon.blogspot.com/2012/11/alan-gross-bombshell-lawsuit-against_16.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AlongTheMalecn+%28Along+the+Malec%C3%B3n%29</i></span></span></div>
<br /></div>
</div>
John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-8457625224608369082012-11-08T11:21:00.001-05:002012-11-08T11:21:24.253-05:00Presidential Authority to Lift Most of Embargo<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Use 'smart power' to help Cubans</div>
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BY VICKI HUDDLESTON and CARLOS PASCUAL</div>
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Miami Herald Op Ed 2/24/09</div>
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www.brookings.edu</div>
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Contrary to popular myth and public
misunderstanding, if President Barack Obama wishes to change the U.S.
policy toward Cuba, he has ample authority to do so. If he takes
charge of Cuba policy, he can turn the embargo into an effective
instrument of ''smart power'' to achieve the United States' policy
objectives in Cuba.</div>
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Obama's leadership is needed to change
the dynamic between the United States and Cuba. The status quo is no
longer an option. Not only has it failed to achieve its goals; it has
tarnished our image in the hemisphere and throughout the world.
Waiting for Congress to act will only further delay change.
Fortunately, even in the case of Cuba, Congress has not materially
impaired this country's venerable constitutional arrangement under
which the president has the ultimate authority to conduct our foreign
affairs.</div>
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Executive authority</div>
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Again and again we hear that the
embargo can't be changed because the Helms-Burton law codified it.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Whether you agree or
disagree with the current commercial embargo, the president can
effectively dismantle it by using his executive authority.
Helms-Burton codified the embargo regulation, but those regulations
provide that ``all transactions are prohibited except as specifically
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations,
rulings, instructions, and licenses.''</div>
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This means that the president's power
remains unfettered. He can instruct the secretary to extend, revise
or modify embargo regulations. The proof of this statement is that
President Bill Clinton issued new regulations for expanded travel and
remittances in order to help individuals and grow civil society.</div>
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Obama will have to modify Office of
Foreign Assets Control regulations to fulfill his campaign promise to
increase Cuban-American travel and remittances. If he wants to
reproduce the more open conditions in Cuba that led to the ''Cuban
Spring'' of 2002 and Oswaldo Payá's Varela Project, he could
reinstate people-to-people and educational travel. By a simple rule
change, he could also speed the entry of life-saving medicines from
Cuba, rather than subjecting them to delays from cumbersome OFAC
licensing procedures.</div>
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Since 1992, U.S. law -- the Cuban
Democracy Act -- has sought to expand access to ideas, knowledge and
information by licensing telecommunications goods and services. Yet,
in practice, regulations are so strictly interpreted that the United
States in effect is imposing a communications embargo on Cuba. To
lift it, the president can authorize a general license for the
donation and sale of radios, televisions and computers. In addition,
rather than helping Cuban state security keep Yoani Sánchez and
others off the Internet, the Obama administration could make Internet
technology readily available so that any barriers to communications
would be clearly the fault of the Cuban government, and not ours.</div>
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Environmental concerns rate high with
the Obama administration. So it might open bilateral discussions,
exchange information and license the provision of scientific
equipment to improve the health of the ocean and success of
commercial fisheries.</div>
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The United States Geological Survey
estimates that the North Cuba Basin holds 5.5 billion barrels of oil
and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. If the president
wishes, he can instruct the secretary of the treasury to license U.S.
companies to explore, exploit and transport these resources that we
and the region so badly need.</div>
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Failed policy</div>
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After a half-century of failed policy,
there is enormous support in the Cuban-American community for
initiatives that will improve the well being and independence of the
Cuban people. What they didn't know -- but know now -- is that there
is no reason they can't reach out to the Cuban people and still
retain the embargo as symbol of their concern about the Cuban
government's failure to live up to international norms of human
rights, democracy and transparency.</div>
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</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
Vicki Huddleston is a visiting fellow
at the Brookings Institution and former chief of the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana. Carlos Pascual is vice president of the Brookings
Institution. They are co-directors of the Brookings project on U.S.
Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition.</div>
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</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/other-views/story/918404.html</div>
</div>
John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-39953429039893906562012-06-13T17:38:00.001-05:002012-06-13T17:38:24.116-05:00Alan Gross from his own reports<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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AP IMPACT: USAID contractor work in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> detailed</div>
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Originally published: February 12, 2012 10:41 AM</div>
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Updated: February 12, 2012 5:23 PM</div>
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By The Associated Press
DESMOND BUTLER (Associated Press)</div>
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<st1:state w:st="on">WASHINGTON</st1:state> - (AP) -- Piece
by piece, in backpacks and carry-on bags, American aid contractor Alan Gross
made sure laptops, smartphones, hard drives and networking equipment were
secreted into <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>.
The most sensitive item, according to official trip reports, was the last one:
a specialized mobile phone chip that experts say is often used by the Pentagon
and the CIA to make satellite signals virtually impossible to track.</div>
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The purpose, according to an Associated Press review of
Gross' reports, was to set up uncensored satellite Internet service for <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>'s small
Jewish community.</div>
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The operation was funded as democracy promotion for the U.S.
Agency for International Development, established in 1961 to provide economic,
development and humanitarian assistance around the world in support of <st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place>
foreign policy goals. Gross, however, identified himself as a member of a
Jewish humanitarian group, not a representative of the <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> government.</div>
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Cuban President Raul Castro called him a spy, and Gross was
sentenced last March to 15 years in prison for seeking to "undermine the
integrity and independence" of Cuba. <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> officials say he did nothing
wrong and was just carrying out the normal mission of USAID.</div>
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Gross said at his trial in <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place> that he was a "trusting
fool" who was duped. But his trip reports indicate that he knew his
activities were illegal in <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>
and that he worried about the danger, including possible expulsion.</div>
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One report says a community leader "made it abundantly
clear that we are all 'playing with fire.'"</div>
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Another time Gross said: "This is very risky business
in no uncertain terms."</div>
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And finally: "Detection of satellite signals will be
catastrophic."</div>
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The case has heightened frictions in the decades-long
political struggle between the United States and its communist neighbor to the
south, and raises questions about how far democracy-building programs have gone
-- and whether cloak-and-dagger work is better left to intelligence operatives.</div>
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Gross' company, JBDC Inc., which specializes in setting up
Internet access in remote locations like Iraq and Afghanistan, had been hired
by Development Alternatives Inc., or DAI, of Bethesda, Maryland, which had a
multimillion-dollar contract with USAID to break Cuba's information blockade by
"technological outreach through phone banks, satellite Internet and cell
phones."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
USAID officials reviewed Gross' trip reports and received
regular briefings on his progress, according to DAI spokesman Steven O'Connor.
The reports were made available to the AP by a person familiar with the case
who insisted on anonymity because of the documents' sensitivity.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The reports cover four visits over a five-month period in
2009. Another report, written by a representative of Gross' company, covered
his fifth and final trip, the one that ended with his arrest on Dec. 3, 2009.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Together, the reports detail the lengths to which Gross went
to escape Cuban authorities' detection.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
To avoid airport scrutiny, Gross enlisted the help of other
American Jews to bring in electronic equipment a piece at a time. He instructed
his helpers to pack items, some of them banned in <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>, in carry-on luggage, not
checked bags.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
He once drove seven hours after clearing security and
customs rather than risk airport searches.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On his final trip, he brought in a "discreet" SIM
card -- or subscriber identity module card -- intended to keep satellite phone
transmissions from being pinpointed within 250 miles (400 kilometers), if they
were detected at all.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The type of SIM card used by Gross is not available on the
open market and is distributed only to governments, according to an official at
a satellite telephone company familiar with the technology and a former U.S.
intelligence official who has used such a chip. The officials, who spoke on
condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the technology, said the
chips are provided most frequently to the Defense Department and the CIA, but
also can be obtained by the State Department, which oversees USAID.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Asked how Gross obtained the card, USAID spokesman Drew
Bailey said only that the agency played no role in helping Gross acquire
equipment. "We are a development agency, not an intelligence agency,"
he said.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>'s
communist government considers all USAID democracy promotion activities to be
illegal and a national security threat. USAID denies that any of its work is
covert.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Gross' American lawyer, Peter J. Kahn, declined comment but
has said in the past that Gross' actions were not aimed at subverting the Cuban
government.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Cuban authorities consider Internet access to be a matter of
national security and block some sites that are critical of the government, as
well as pages with content that they deem as counterrevolutionary. Most Cubans
have access only to a severely restricted island-wide Intranet service.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Proponents of providing Internet access say it can undermine
authoritarian governments that control the flow of information to their people.
Critics say the practice not only endangers contractors like Gross, but all
American aid workers, even those not involved in secret activities.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"All too often, the outside perception is that these
USAID people are intelligence officers," said Philip Giraldi, an ex-CIA
officer. "That makes it bad for USAID, it makes it bad for the CIA and for
any other intelligence agency who like to fly underneath the radar."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Even before he delivered the special SIM card, Gross noted
in a trip report that use of Internet satellite phones would be
"problematic if exposed." He was aware that authorities were using
sophisticated detection equipment and said he saw workers for the
government-owned telecommunications service provider conduct a radio frequency
"sniff" the day before he was to set up a community's Wi-Fi
operation.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
___</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<st1:place w:st="on"><br /></st1:place></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place>
diplomats say they believe Gross was arrested to pressure the Obama
administration to roll back its democracy-promotion programs. The Cuban
government has alleged without citing any evidence that the programs, funded
under a 1996 law calling for regime change in Cuba, are run by the CIA as part
of an intelligence plan to topple the government in Havana.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
While the <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region>
government broadly outlines the goals of its aid programs in publicly available
documents, the work in <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>
could not exist without secrecy because it is illegal there. Citing security
concerns, <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region>
agencies have refused to provide operational details even to congressional
committees overseeing the programs.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"The reason there is less disclosure on these programs
in totalitarian countries is because the people are already risking their lives
to exercise their fundamental rights," said Mauricio Claver-Carone, who
runs the Washington-based Cuba Democracy Advocates.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
USAID rejected the notion that its contractors perform
covert work.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"Nothing about USAID's <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place> programs is covert or
classified in any way," says Mark Lopes, a deputy assistant administrator.
"We simply carry out activities in a discreet manner to ensure the
greatest possible safety of all those involved."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The U.S. National Security Act defines "covert" as
government activities aimed at influencing conditions abroad "where it is
intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
USAID's democracy promotion work in <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place> was spurred by a large boost
in funding under the Bush administration and a new focus on providing
communications technology to Cubans. <st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place> funding for Cuban aid
multiplied from $3.5 million in 2000 to $45 million in 2008. It's now $20
million.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Gross was paid a half-million dollars as a USAID
subcontractor, according to <st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place>
officials familiar with the contract. They spoke only on condition of anonymity
because they are not authorized to discuss the case.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
USAID head Raj Shah said democracy promotion is
"absolutely central" to his agency's work. The Obama administration
says its <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>
programs aim to help politically repressed citizens enjoy fundamental rights by
providing humanitarian support, encouraging democratic development and aiding
the free flow of information.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region>
officials say Gross' work was not subversion because he was setting up
connections for <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>'s
Jewish community, not for dissidents. Jewish leaders have said that they were
unaware of Gross' connections to the <st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place> government and that they
already were provided limited Internet access. USAID has not said why it
thought the community needed such sensitive technology.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Asked if such programs are meant to challenge existing
leaders, Lopes said, "For USAID, our democracy programs in <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>
are not about changing a particular regime. That's for the Cuban people to
decide, and we believe they should be afforded that choice."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Others disagree.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"Of course, this is covert work," said Robert
Pastor, President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser for Latin America
and now director of the Center for Democracy and Election Management at <st1:placename w:st="on">American</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">University</st1:placetype>
in <st1:place w:st="on">Washington</st1:place>.
"It's about regime change."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
___</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Gross, of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Potomac</st1:city>,
<st1:state w:st="on">Maryland</st1:state></st1:place>, was a gregarious man,
about 6 feet (1.8 meters) and 250 pounds (113 kilograms). He was hard to miss.
He had bought a Rosetta Stone language course to improve his rudimentary
Spanish and had scant knowledge of <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>. But he knew technology. His
company specialized in installing communications gear in remote parts of the
world.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Gross' first trip for DAI, which ended in early April 2009,
focused on getting equipment in and setting up the first of three facilities
with Wi-Fi hotspots that would give unrestricted Internet access to hundreds of
Cubans, especially the island's small Jewish community of 1,500.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
To get the materials in, Gross relied on American Jewish
humanitarian groups doing missions on the island. He traveled with the groups,
relying on individuals to help bring in the equipment, according to the trip
reports.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Three people briefed on Gross' work say he told contacts in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> he represented a Jewish organization, not
the <st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place>
government. USAID says it now expects people carrying out its programs to
disclose their <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region>
government funding to the people they are helping -- if asked.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
One of Gross' reports suggests he represented himself as a
member of one of the groups and that he traveled with them so he could
intercede with Cuban authorities if questions arose.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The helpers were supposed to pack single pieces of equipment
in their carry-on luggage. That way, Gross wrote, any questions could best be
handled during the X-ray process at security, rather than at a customs check.
The material was delivered to Gross later at a <st1:place w:st="on">Havana</st1:place> hotel, according to the trip reports.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
USAID has long relied on visitors willing to carry in
prohibited material, such as books and shortwave radios, <st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place> officials briefed on the
programs say. And USAID officials have acknowledged in congressional briefings
that they have used contractors to bring in software to send encrypted messages
over the Internet, according to participants in the briefings.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
An alarm sounded on one of Gross' trips when one of his
associates tried to leave the airport terminal; the courier had placed his
cargo -- a device that can extend the range of a wireless network -- into his
checked bag.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Gross intervened, saying the device was for personal use and
was not a computer hard drive or a radio.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
According to the trip reports, customs officials wanted to
charge a 100 percent tax on the value of the item, but Gross bargained them
down and was allowed to leave with it.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"On that day, it was better to be lucky than
smart," Gross wrote.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Much of the equipment Gross helped bring in is legal in <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>,
but the volume of the goods could have given Cuban authorities a good idea of
what he was up to.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"Total equipment" listed on his fourth trip
included 12 iPods, 11 BlackBerry Curve smartphones, three MacBooks, six
500-gigabyte external drives, three Internet satellite phones known as BGANs,
three routers, three controllers, 18 wireless access points, 13 memory sticks,
three phones to make calls over the Internet, and networking switches. Some
pieces, such as the networking and satellite equipment, are explicitly
forbidden in <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Gross wrote that he smuggled the BGANs in a backpack. He had
hoped to fool authorities by taping over the identifying words on the
equipment: "Hughes," the manufacturer, and "Inmarsat," the
company providing the satellite Internet service.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The BGANs were crucial because they provide not only
satellite telephone capacity but an Internet signal that can establish a Wi-Fi
hotspot for multiple users. The appeal of using satellite Internet connections
is that data goes straight up, never passing through government-controlled
servers.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
___</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
There was always the chance of being discovered.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Last year, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked
about clandestine methods used to hide the programs and reports that some of
them had been penetrated.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"Possible counterintelligence penetration is a known risk
in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>,"
the State Department said in a written response to AP. "Those who carry
out our assistance are aware of such risks."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Gross' first trip to <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>
ended in early April 2009 with establishment of a communications site in <st1:city w:st="on">Havana</st1:city>.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
He went back later that month and stayed about 10 days while
a site was set up in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Santiago</st1:city>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place>'s
second-largest city.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On his third trip, for two weeks in June 2009, Gross
traveled to a city in the middle of the island identified by a <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> official as <st1:place w:st="on">Camaguey</st1:place>. He rented a car in <st1:city w:st="on">Havana</st1:city> and drove seven hours rather than risk
another encounter with airport authorities.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Gross wrote that BGANs should not be used outside <st1:city w:st="on">Havana</st1:city>, where there were
enough radio frequency devices to hide the emissions.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The report for Gross's fourth trip, which ended early that
August, was marked final and summarized his successes: wireless networks
established in three communities; about 325 users; "communications to and
from the U.S. have improved and used on a regular basis." He again concluded
the operation was "very risky business."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
___</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Gross would have been fine if he had stopped there.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In late November 2009, however, he went back to <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>
for a fifth time. This time he didn't return. He was arrested 11 days later.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
An additional report was written afterward on the letterhead
of Gross' company. It was prepared with assistance from DAI to fulfill a
contract requirement for a summary of his work, and so everyone could get paid,
according to officials familiar with the document.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The report said Gross had planned to improve security of the
<st1:city w:st="on">Havana</st1:city> site by
installing an "alternative sim card" on the satellite equipment.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The card would mask the signal of the BGAN as it transmitted
to a satellite, making it difficult to track where the device was located.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The document concluded that the site's security had been
increased.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It is unclear how DAI confirmed Gross' work for the report
on the final trip, though a document, also on Gross' company letterhead, states
that a representative for Gross contacted the Jewish community in Cuba five
times after his arrest.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In a statement at his trial, Gross professed his innocence
and apologized.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"I have never, would never and will never purposefully
or knowingly do anything personally or professionally to subvert a government,"
he said. "I am deeply sorry for being a trusting fool. I was duped. I was
used."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In an interview with AP, his wife, Judy, blamed DAI, the
company that sent him to <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>,
for misleading him on the risks. DAI spokesman O'Connor said in a statement
that Gross "designed, proposed, and implemented this work" for the
company.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Meanwhile, the 62-year-old Gross sits in a military prison
hospital. His family says he has lost about 100 pounds (45 kilograms) and they
express concern about his health. All the <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region>
diplomatic attempts to win his freedom have come up empty and there is no sign
that <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>
is prepared to act on appeals for a humanitarian release.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
___</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Follow <st1:city w:st="on">Butler</st1:city></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
at http://twitter.com/desmondbutler</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
___</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The AP Investigative Team can be reached at investigate(at)ap.org</div>
</div>John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-10917636907694698472012-06-06T17:59:00.003-05:002012-06-06T17:59:38.794-05:00Julia Sweig Overview for Council on Foreign Relations<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="font-size: 16.0pt;">The Frozen U.S.-Cuba Relationship</span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Interviewee: Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller
Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for <st1:place w:st="on">Latin
America</st1:place> Studies, Council on Foreign Relations</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Interviewer: Brianna Lee, Production Editor, CFR.org</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
February 28, 2012</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Fifty years after the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United
States</st1:country-region> enacted an embargo on all trade and commercial
transactions with <st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place>,
relations between the two countries remain at a standstill. Julia E. Sweig,
CFR's director of Latin American studies, says the Obama administration has
prioritized domestic politics over foreign policy in its relationship with <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>, even as Cuban President Raul Castro has
been "moving in the direction of the kind of reforms that every
administration over the last fifty years has called upon <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> to
make." The case of American USAID contractor Alan Gross, currently serving
a fifteen-year prison sentence in Cuba (CubanTriangle) on charges of attempting
to upend the regime through a U.S.-authorized democracy promotion program, has
also heightened tensions, she says. Meanwhile, Sweig adds, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> is strengthening ties with global powers
like <st1:country-region w:st="on">Brazil</st1:country-region>,
as well as the Catholic Church, as the Castro administration seeks to open up
new economic and social spaces for its citizens.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i>We've passed the
fifty-year mark of the breakdown of diplomatic ties between <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> and the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Where do we stand
now? Is normalizing relations even remotely on the table on either side?<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Let me start by talking about three geographical points on
the map that are relevant to the answer. In <st1:state w:st="on">Washington</st1:state>,
the Obama administration, consistent with the approach of the Bush
administration, has made a political decision to subordinate foreign policy and
national interest-based decisions to domestic politics with respect to its <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> policy.
There is a bipartisan group of members of Congress--Democrats and Republicans,
House and Senate--who represent <st1:state w:st="on">Florida</st1:state>,
a state where there are many swing votes that deliver the electoral votes for
any president. Those individuals not only deliver votes, but they deliver
campaign finance, and generally make a lot of noise, and that combination has
persuaded the White House that reelection is more of a priority than taking on
the heavy lifting to set the United States on the path of normalization with
Cuba for now.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"<st1:country-region w:st="on">Brazil</st1:country-region>
is clearly stepping into a space where the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United
States</st1:country-region> should be, and the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> has made a decision
to watch as that happens."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The second point is what's happening in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>. It's not
realistic to expect the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United
States</st1:country-region> to undertake a series of unilateral
moves toward normalization; it needs a willing partner. I believe we have one
in <st1:city w:st="on">Havana</st1:city> but
have failed to read the signals. Raul Castro has now been in office since the
beginning of 2008. Raul holds the reins on both foreign policy and domestic
policy, and, domestically, the politics of implementing a fairly wide range of
economic and political and social reforms are his priority. In a deal that was
coordinated with the help of the Cuban Catholic Church and <st1:country-region w:st="on">Spain</st1:country-region>, he released all of the political
prisoners in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>.
He also is taking a number of steps that imply a major rewriting of the social
contract in Cuba to shrink the size of the state and give Cuban individuals
more freedom--economically, especially, but also in terms of speech--than we've
seen in the last fifty years. He has privatized the residential real estate and
car market[s], expanded much-needed agrarian reform, lifted caps on salaries,
and greatly expanded space for small businesses. He also is moving to deal with
corruption and to prepare the groundwork for a great deal more foreign
investment. He's moving in the direction of the kind of reforms that every
administration over the last fifty years has called upon <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> to make,
albeit under the rubric of a one-party system. There's a broad range of
cooperation--neighborhood security in the Gulf of Mexico, as <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> has just started drilling for oil,
counternarcotics, and natural disasters--between the two countries that is
still not happening, and that gives me the impression that the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> has been unwilling to take
"yes" for an answer and respond positively to steps taken by <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The third geographic part of the story is south <st1:state w:st="on">Florida</st1:state>. When they're
polled, the majority of Cuban-Americans say that the embargo has failed, and
support lifting the travel ban or loosening the embargo or some steps along
that continuum of liberalization and normalization. The one most significant
step that Obama did take when he took office was to eliminate the restriction
on Cuban-American travel and remittances to <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>. Cuban-Americans are now
voting with their feet. If you go to the <st1:city w:st="on">Miami</st1:city>
airport, you will see thirty, forty flights to <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>
a week just out of <st1:city w:st="on">Miami</st1:city>.
Cuban-Americans are now investing in their families' small businesses on the
island. The politics of this are strange because we are told by the Obama
administration that we can't rock the boat of the Cuban-American vote, but
those very voters are in fact demonstrating that they support a radically different
set of policies than, in fact, the Obama administration has supported.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i>The ongoing case of
USAID contractor Alan Gross (AP) has stoked tensions between the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>. At the heart of the matter is
the <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> democracy promotion
program that authorized Gross' travel to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>. What impact does this case
have on U.S.-Cuba relations?<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Precisely because we have no overarching framework for
diplomacy in place and no political will to establish it for now, the Alan
Gross case casts a huge shadow over U.S.-Cuban relations. The heart of the
issue is the context in which those [pro-democracy] programs were being
implemented. We have a full-blown economic embargo with extra-territorial
dimensions that are felt in the banking and finance world--a very comprehensive
and well-enforced sanctions program. The democracy programs sound very mom and
apple pie--USAID has them around the world, its officials will tell you. But
having them in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>
is an extraordinary provocation. They were inherited from the previous
administration's concept of regime change, and under Obama, they remain largely
intact. The programs are purposely kept secret from the American public. There
is no public information about the private and not-for-profit subcontractors in
the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> and around
the world, and Cuban institutions and individuals who may be targets of the
programs are likewise not told they are part of such <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> government programs. The
democracy promotion programs have been deliberately politicized in order to provoke,
and they have succeeded in provoking.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
What's key is the context. There's been no real diplomacy;
there's no negotiating framework that I've seen for a very long period of time,
and again, that has to do with domestic politics. It's very hard to understand
otherwise why this guy's still in jail. The <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> has repeatedly asked
the Cuban government to release Gross unilaterally, with no commitments on our
end. Asking for unilateral gestures, having rebuffed or ignored or failed to
read the signals from <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>,
has created this impasse. Having said that, there can be a diplomatic,
humanitarian solution, and I see no value to keeping Gross in jail and hope he
will be released as soon as possible. But we will need real diplomacy and a
framework for negotiating a range of issues both countries care about.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i>Brazilian President
Dilma Rousseff paid a visit to Cuba recently, and it looks like Cuba's trying
to formulate ties with an influential, rising Latin American power. How does
this burgeoning relationship between <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on">Brazil</st1:country-region> affect <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
relationship with the United States.?<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Brazil</st1:country-region> is
a regional power and a global power; it plays in a number of spaces well beyond
<st1:place w:st="on">Latin America</st1:place>. In the last couple of years it
undertook some major investments, and those investments will grow in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>--in
infrastructure, in agriculture, in perhaps energy as well, and others. <st1:country-region w:st="on">Brazil</st1:country-region> is clearly stepping into a space where
the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> should be,
and the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region>
has made a decision to watch as that happens.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i>How does <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s human
rights situation complicate the relationship between those two countries?<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It doesn't seem to be complicating it at all.
Rousseff--given her own history of having spent three years in jail and being
tortured in the 1970s and having worked to make human rights more of a domestic
and foreign policy--her presidency has quite a bit of standing with respect to
talking to any government, including the Cuban government, about human rights.
She was criticized by her own public, especially in the media, a great deal for
choosing to have those discussions with <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> privately. But I would suggest
that having a public, browbeating, rhetorical approach has almost always
backfired for major heads of state when dealing with Cuba, and if you look at
the success that the Catholic Church and the Spanish government had around the
political prisoner release, that success derived from a basic fundamental
degree of respect, cooperation, and engagement as the framework for the
relationship.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i>The Pope is set to
make a highly anticipated visit to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> in March. What's the
significance of this visit?<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Pope John Paul II went to <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>
in 1998, and that was very significant because that was just a few years after
a new constitution in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>
had affirmed the right of religious believers to hold senior positions in
government. In the decade-plus that's transpired since, the Catholic Church
under Archbishop Jaime Ortega has become the most important provider of social
services outside of the state. It has started its own business school; it has
opened space for itself and for others for publications, opinion, and debate;
it has worked in concert with the Cuban government, especially with Raul
Castro, on a very nationalist project of building a more open society in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>. This Pope
is a different person than Pope John Paul, and it's highly anticipated, but
he's coming at a time when already there is substantial change under way in
that country. The visit will help the Cuban Catholic Church create space for
itself and continue to create space for itself, and signal to the Cuban
government that it's an institution that can be relied upon to support the
kinds of reforms that the government itself wants to make happen.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It's important to note that the Pope's going to <st1:country-region w:st="on">Mexico</st1:country-region> on this trip, and <st1:country-region w:st="on">Mexico</st1:country-region>'s population of practicing Catholics is
proportionally much bigger than <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>'s.
In <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region>,
the syncretic religions are widely practiced. The Catholic Church is an
incredibly important institution, but it would be a mistake to think of <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> the way we do <st1:country-region w:st="on">Mexico</st1:country-region>, as a predominantly Catholic
society.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i>Raul Castro held the
First National Conference of the Cuban Communist Party last month. What was he
hoping to accomplish?<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This conference was preceded by a Party congress in April
2011, and you have to think about both in tandem. The biggest take-away from
the Party conference was the formalization of term limits for senior officials
in the Cuban government, both elected and appointed. That's a very significant
step forward in terms of political reform, given that many of the top leaders
in the politburo are over sixty-five and have been working in those positions
or other senior positions for their entire careers. It's also an important sign
to the junior people who are building their political careers that they're not
going to be permanent.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
"Political party space, like having a multi-party
system, that's not the top priority for Cubans. But what is a top priority is
having the opportunity to make good for themselves."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The broader consequences of the congress and the conference
were for Raul to continue a process that has been pretty slow and difficult of
building a consensus among the longtime beneficiaries of the status quo that
the status quo needs to change. One key thing for the Communist Party is to get
the Communist Party out of day-to-day government. The party is supposed to be a
political party, sort of ideological ballast, but it isn't supposed to be
running ministries or having the kind of major role bureaucratically and
politically that it's had over the last fifty years.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The other piece is to institute accountability and
transparency within the institutions of governance themselves. That process
means a radical overhaul of the way things have happened for the last fifty
years.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i>How strong is the
Cuban society's desire to move beyond the one-party system?<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It's very strong. Public opinion is complicated because on
the one hand, Cubans want change and they want much more space--economic space,
speech space. I would say political party space, like having a multi-party
system, that's not the top priority for Cubans. But what is a top priority is
having the opportunity to make good for themselves with the wonderful education
they have and to run businesses and to have the state get out of the way, while
continuing to provide the basic social services that the entire population has
benefited from and gotten so accustomed to.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<a href="http://www.cfr.org/cuba/frozen-us-cuba-relationship/p27510">http://www.cfr.org/cuba/frozen-us-cuba-relationship/p27510</a></div>
</div>John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-82456033415225954522012-01-25T23:47:00.000-05:002012-01-25T23:47:01.584-05:00Prominent Conservative Wants Big Change in US PolicyMort Zuckerman: Time for U.S. to Review Its Cuba Policy<br />
<br />
Raul Castro has succeeded Fidel and is reining in the all-pervasive Cuban government<br />
<br />
By MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN<br />
<br />
January 12, 2012<br />
<br />
It is past time to change our policy toward Cuba. For over 50 years, the United States has been obsessed with the Cuba of Fidel Castro's time. So much so that many of the circumstances that animate our conversations and views of Cuba today seem to be drawn from the 20th century. They are a throwback to the days when Cuba was a menacing outpost of an aggressive Soviet Union. Admittedly, it's hard to forget the days of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. We forced the removal of those missiles, then sought to punish and bring down the Castro regime by a trade embargo (and some madcap covert schemes).<br />
<br />
For over 49 years those policies have failed. And they are inappropriate for the Cuba of today. About 70 percent of Cubans were born after the original revolution. They are pressuring the state to get out of their way.<br />
<br />
Since a chance meeting with Fidel Castro many years ago, I have had hours of conversation with him over many visits, including one a few weeks ago. Castro has overcome several bouts of serious illness. As he put it, "Nobody thought I would get through my illness, but here I am at work." And so he is, but he is playing a different role. The most critical change is that his brother, Raúl Castro, has succeeded him as president in a transition marked by a noteworthy degree of stability.<br />
<br />
Fidel is certainly at work and active and still an inspiration for Cubans. They respect and admire him for establishing an excellent system of free healthcare; an improved educational system; and a relatively colorblind, multiracial society in which most of the institutionalized racism against blacks and mulattoes has been eliminated. They also take pride in the way he stood up to America.<br />
<br />
He was teased a number of years ago that if he had been a slightly better baseball pitcher and made it to the major leagues, Cuba and the United States would not have had years of conflict. Castro's response was, "I was a good pitcher, but I am a great revolutionary." He is still involved, for as he has said, "Revolutionaries do not retire." But Fidel's role today is that of the senior statesman concentrating on the international stage, long a key interest for him, rather than the head of state on the domestic stage.<br />
<br />
The driver for change in Cuba now is Raúl Castro. The pace of change will be, as he puts it, "without pause, but without haste." To implement his judgment that structural reforms are needed to revitalize Cuba's stagnant economy, he has become the principal architect in abandoning the all-pervasive role of the state and shifting a good part of economic activity to the private sector. Speech is freer. He has called on Cubans to openly air their opinions in the form of numerous town hall-style meetings. He has listened. Policies he announced have ultimately been refined and changed by the process.<br />
<br />
He has eliminated excessive bans and regulations, encouraged productivity, and sought to make the government smaller and more efficient. This is a major change from Fidel's totally planned economy to a more market-oriented one, despite the forces of bureaucratic inertia and resistance. For the first time in over five decades, there are new rules that support the legitimization of the private sector. Free-market mechanisms have been embraced, such as self-employment, a new tax code, and liberalized rules on such things as home and auto ownership. Hundreds of thousands of licenses have been granted to Cubans to operate private businesses. A financing mechanism provides credit to would-be entrepreneurs.<br />
<br />
Cubans finally have the right to sell and buy their homes. Many Cuban-Americans have been encouraged enough to accelerate the process by sending money to relatives. Cubans are now also allowed to purchase cellphones, DVDs, and other items that were once restricted. All these reforms are helping to change public attitudes; fewer young people want to leave. Not bad for a government that heretofore had followed a centralized communist economic model.<br />
<br />
The church has also been positive. It has helped to negotiate the release of political prisoners, now significantly fewer. It has encouraged the move to free markets, providing counseling that reflects the words of the late Pope John Paul II when he called for "Cuba to open to the world, and the world to open to Cuba."<br />
The Cuban-American community in the United States has also changed. Many now believe the embargo should end and the travel ban lifted. This, too, reflects a generational shift. Younger Cuban-Americans, who now outnumber the aging Cuban exiles of the 1960s, have a different attitude. They think of Cuba not in terms of politics and ideology but of family and friendships. Using so-called gift parcels, they are supplying their families in Cuba with tools and other goods for use in small businesses.<br />
<br />
President Obama, in tune with these changes, has sought a better relationship with Cuba. He has lifted Bush-era restrictions on family travel and remittances. Last year over 300,000 people took charter flights from Florida to Cuba. Many are from the younger generation, and some no doubt dislike the Cuban leadership and what it represents. But they consider family reunification and support to be their priority. They think that after 50 years, it is time to try something different with Cuba.<br />
<br />
The question for Americans is how to relate to the new evolving Cuba. I believe there is wisdom in Henry Kissinger's view. He lived through the grim years as secretary of state, and had said: "It is better to deal straight with Castro. Behave chivalrously," and think in broader terms.<br />
<br />
One step to improve our relationship—and advantage America—is to remove the restrictions on exports of agricultural products. All sectors of the U.S. economy would benefit by freeing commodity sales. It would increase our revenues by perhaps $300 million to $500 million a year. Food should not be seen as a weapon but as a way to build a better longer-term relationship between the two countries, as was shown by the experience between East and West Germany.<br />
<br />
Our restriction is pointless anyway. Cubans have access to food through imports from countries like Vietnam and China. Our regulations are simply restricting the ability of our farmers and agribusinesses to trade with Cuba while competitors exploit the opportunities to take over the sales we would otherwise have. We don't hesitate to trade with other communist countries. We even offer them credit. It is not very sensible to worry over selling wheat to Cuba and putting that money into the pockets of American farmers. As for restricting travel to Cuba, we have allowed Americans to travel to Iran, China, and Russia.<br />
<br />
There is every evidence, moreover, that when we have liberalized intercourse with closed societies, they have become more open, with greater freedoms for their populations. China is a case in point. For this reason, we should be willing to open up Internet access and allow Americans to travel to Cuba.<br />
I recognize there remain serious political issues between Cuba and the United States. The Cubans have jailed Alan Gross, a subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development. He was implementing a U.S. government democracy-building program, distributing computers, cellphones, and satellite communication technologies for nongovernmental organizations. The Cuban government interpreted this as a subversive activity and arrested him. This has now become a main obstacle to improving relations.<br />
<br />
The Cuban government wants to have any humanitarian release of Gross matched by some degree of reciprocity. One possibility is that the United States would allow a recently released Cuban spy to serve out his next three years of parole in Cuba rather than in Florida. (He was one of five Cuban officers sent here in the 1990s to spy on anti-Castro militant groups. A release of all five is another possibility.)<br />
Whatever the process, quiet diplomacy should be able to resolve such issues and inspire a more positive rapport. The main hurdle is political: A portion of the Cuban-American community takes a very hard-line view of the Castro government and remains a powerful political force in the key swing state of Florida. The attitude of the presidential candidates will be a good test of their vision and diplomatic skills.<br />
<br />
We should not try to seal off Cuba from the American influence that has so profoundly changed much of the rest of the world. We cannot bully a country by starvation or deny its people the right to rejoin their families. We can move forward in our relationship with Cuba and still maintain American interests and values.<br />
<br />
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2012/01/12/mort-zuckerman-time-for-us-to-reviews-its-cuba-policyJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-30354038667792409272011-12-29T22:44:00.000-05:002011-12-29T22:44:58.233-05:00Insider Critique of USAID Regime Change ProgramsTime to clean up U.S. regime-change programs in Cuba <br />
<br />
BY FULTON ARMSTRONG fultona1@yahoo.com <br />
<br />
As USAID subcontractor Alan P. Gross marked his second year in a Cuban prison for carrying out secret “democracy promotion” operations, White House spokesman Jay Carney demanded his immediate release and gloated: “Cuban authorities have failed in their effort to use Gross as a pawn for their own ends.” <br />
<br />
The message is simple: Gross is our pawn, not the Cubans’.The administration’s signals throughout the Gross affair have been clear. To Havana, it’s been “no negotiation.” To Gross, “tough luck.” And to Americans who think our 50-year Cuba policy should be reviewed, it is, “Don’t hold your breath.”<br />
<br />
When a covert action run by the CIA goes bad and a clandestine officer gets arrested, the U.S. government works up a strategy for negotiating his release. When a covert operator working for USAID gets arrested, Washington turns up the rhetoric, throws more money at the compromised program, and refuses to talk. <br />
<br />
For three years, I was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s lead investigator into the political operations of the State Department and USAID in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. <br />
<br />
The Cuba programs — designed to identify, organize, train and mobilize Cubans to demand political change — have an especially problematic heritage, including embezzlement, mismanagement, and systemic politicization. Some program successes costing millions of taxpayer dollars, such as the creation of a network of “independent libraries,” were grossly exaggerated or fabricated.<br />
<br />
An oversight committee’s mandate is to ensure that funds — about $20 million a year but surging to $45 million in 2009 — are used effectively and in a manner consistent with U.S. law. <br />
<br />
State and USAID fought us at every turn, refusing to divulge even basic information about the programs, citing only a document of vague “program objectives.” The programs did not involve our Intelligence Community, but the secrecy surrounding them, the clandestine tradecraft (including the use of advanced encryption technologies) and the deliberate concealment of the U.S. hand, had all the markings of an intelligence covert operation. We never requested the names of their on-island operatives, but program managers claimed that “people will die” if we knew the names of even U.S.-based “partner” groups.<br />
<br />
The programs were not a secret in Cuba. The Cuban government had them deeply penetrated. We did not know who Alan P. Gross was — indeed, the State Department vehemently denied he was theirs after his arrest, and even some of our diplomats in Havana thought he was working for CIA. But it was clear that the Cubans had been on him. Cuban television has shown video of other contractors in action on the island.<br />
<br />
Only Gross can say what he knew about Cuban law as he carried out his $585,000 contract, including five visits to Cuba. He has said that he was “duped.” We confirmed that State and USAID had no policy in place to brief individuals conducting these secret operations that they are not legal in Cuba, nor that U.S. law does not allow unregistered foreign agents to travel around the country providing satellite gear, wide-area WiFi hotspots, encryption and telephony equipment and other cash-value assistance.<br />
<br />
Administration policy is that Cuban recipients not be told the origin and purpose of the assistance — unless they ask directly. Some Cubans can guess, of course, but the implications of non-disclosure, especially as new programs target children as young as 12, are significant in a country that expressly outlaws receiving U.S. funds.<br />
<br />
USAID has emerged as a covert warrior to undermine anti-U.S. regimes worldwide — without the burden of accountability imposed on the Intelligence Community. The regime-change focus of the programs is explicit: Rather than fund them under education and cultural authorities, the Bush and Obama administrations have insisted on citing authorities in the Helms-Burton “Libertad Act” prescribing a post-Castro future for Cuba.<br />
<br />
Fixes have been repeatedly proposed to increase efficiencies and steer funds to help the Cuban people improve their lives, such as by taking advantage of the incipient economic adjustments that Raúl Castro has begun — to help people help themselves, not just organize and mobilize them for protests. USAID’s firm reaction has been that the programs are not to help Cubans live better lives today but rather help them demand a better future tomorrow. Regime change.<br />
<br />
Like the other millions of dollars we have spent to topple the Cuban government, these programs have failed even to provoke the regime, except to arrest Gross and hassle people who have accepted assistance from other on-island operators. <br />
<br />
Our policy should be based on what’s effective at promoting the U.S. national interest — peaceful, democratic and evolutionary change — not engaging in gratuitous provocations. Rhetoric and actions that prolong the prison stay of an innocent American apparently duped into being a pawn in the U.S. government’s 50-year effort to achieve regime change in Cuba are counterproductive. It’s time to clean up the regime-change programs and negotiate Alan P. Gross’s release.<br />
<br />
Fulton Armstrong has worked on the Cuba issue on the National Security Council during the Clinton administration and later as National Intelligence Officer for Latin America and senior advisor on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.<br />
<br />
Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/12/25/v-fullstory/2559755/time-to-clean-up-us-regime-change.html#storylink=cpy#storylink=cpyJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-27790106059642434352011-12-22T09:35:00.000-05:002011-12-22T09:35:07.353-05:00Grand Valley State University Baseball TeamGVSU to Cuba for baseball, med supplies<br />
Lakers play 6 games in 4 days against Cuban team<br />
<br />
Published : Wednesday, 21 Dec 2011, 5:05 PM EST<br />
<br />
By Steve Kelso<br />
ALLENDALE, Mich. (WOOD) - Skylar Hoke is a freshman right-handed pitcher for the Grand Valley State University Lakers. When he makes his college debut, it will be in Havana, Cuba. <br />
<br />
The Lakers will be only the second team from the United States to play against a Cuban team in Cuba when they travel to the island for a four-game series between January 3-9, 2012. <br />
<br />
They'll face a Cuban national university team , but they're also joining forces with First Hand Aid , a Grand Rapids-based organization that has delivered medical supplies to Cuba for more than a decade. <br />
<br />
"Every three months we travel down and just bring hundreds of pounds of medical supplies that Cuba cannot get because of the embargo," said First Hand Aid director Marc Bohland. "It cannot be sold to them. It can only be donated." <br />
<br />
For GVSU head baseball coach Steve Lyon, it's a dream come true. It's a chance for his team to play against some of the best ball players in the world and an opportunity to build the character of his players as they bind together as a team. <br />
<br />
"This is going to be an experience for them, baseball-wise," he said, "but also just culturally and the humanitarian efforts that we are going to be doing while we are there, I think, is an extremely important experience for our guys to have." <br />
<br />
Hoke, the freshman pitcher, is not exactly sure what to expect. He's both excited and a little nervous. <br />
<br />
"It will make you realize just how much and how special and how fortunate we are to have it here," he said.<br />
<br />
http://www.woodtv.com/dpp/sports/GVSU-to-Cuba-for-baseball-med-suppliesJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-88587140681294952162011-12-15T06:32:00.000-05:002011-12-15T06:32:19.461-05:00Cantaclaro's Insight on Alan Gross and The Five<i>The following appeared as comments to an excellent post by Phil Peters at the Cuban Triangle http://cubantriangle.blogspot.com/2011/12/alan-gross-on-his-own.html</i><br />
<br />
Anonymous said...<br />
<br />
Mr. Peters,<br />
<br />
I suspect, although the Cubans themselves are a little confused about what they are accusing Alan Gross of, that Alan Gross was arrested because he was attempting to set up a mesh network in Cuba, of the type that the State Department has been developing to use in hostile totalitarian countries that do not allow their population to have permanent or temporary internet access and that, although the efforts to develop such a network in Cuba while Alan Gross is arrested, they will be resumed with more precaution once he is released.<br />
<br />
So I believe that this is one additional reason for the Cuban government to refuse to release Alan Gross.<br />
<br />
Not only is he their sole negotiation chip for the release of their five cuban spies imprisoned in the US, but while he is imprisoned, the Cuban government is reasonably certain that the US government will not continue to make efforts to provide clandestine internet access to a part of its population.<br />
<br />
This is a message to discuss a small part of the problem people may not normally be aware of.<br />
<br />
In a series of future ones, if you allow me, I'll try to comment by parts the whole Alan Gross five Cuban spies enchilada.<br />
<br />
Cantaclaro<br />
<br />
<br />
DECEMBER 4, 2011 1:23 AM<br />
<br />
Anonymous said...<br />
<br />
The official Cuban government version of events is that:<br />
<br />
1- During the nineties the right wing Cubans in the United States were financing a series of terrorist incidents in Havana hotels to scare off foreign tourists and that the US government was not doing anything about it.<br />
<br />
2- The Cuban government sent over to the US a series of agents to infiltrate these right wing groups discover their plans and communicate them to the Cuban government so that the terrorist activities in the island could be neutralized.<br />
<br />
3- After obtaining sufficient evidence of these activities from his agents, Fidel Castro decided that the Cuban government should contact the FBI and provide them with this information to give the FBI the necessary leads to investigate these right wing groups, verify their criminal activities, prosecute them and put an end to them.<br />
<br />
4- Instead of doing this the FBI handed over the information that had been provided by the Cuban government to the right wing Cuban groups in the United States that Castro accused of promoting terrorism.<br />
<br />
5- Then, with the active aid of these Cuban right wing groups, the FBI reversed engineered the information to trace back the Cuban government informants infiltrated within these groups.<br />
<br />
6- Once located, these Cuban government agents were placed under observation, proof of their activities was gathered and once a sufficient amount was available they were finally arrested and prosecuted.<br />
<br />
7- All those arrested accepted they were Cuban agents but stated that they were not in the US to spy on the US government or military but that their sole purpose was to report on the right wing groups financing and promoting terrorist activities inside the island.<br />
<br />
8- The US government prosecution on the other hand attempted to prove that they were guilty of more heinous crimes such as spying on the US government and being involved in the plot that resulted in the downing of two planes and the death of four Cuban American Castro opponents on 2/24/1996.<br />
<br />
Several very important conclusions that have a bearing on the present imbroglio can be derived from all the ground we have covered so far.<br />
<br />
From the Cuban government perspective, the FBI acted in bad faith when it used the evidence about a group promoting terrorist activity that the Cuban government had supplied it to prosecute the informants instead of the perpetrators of a terrorist activity.<br />
<br />
What was even more aggravating was that this bad faith action made Fidel Castro look like a snitch to his own subordinates and thus undermined their loyalty to him.<br />
<br />
This is a very serious charge on a regime that is held together in by the bonds of loyalty between the charismatic supreme leader and his subordinates.<br />
<br />
Fidel Castro and his brother must do their utmost to recover these convicted spies in order to try to regain the full confidence of their subordinates that is needed to ensure their own future political survival in a very hostile world. <br />
<br />
This is the reason that they attach so much importance to recovering them. <br />
<br />
While they remain in prison, their subordinates have a reason to distrust them and this weakens the monolithic coherence of the Cuban totalitarian regime!<br />
<br />
When that trust begins to disappear, such totalitarian regime, based on personal loyalty to a charismatic leader, also starts to crumble.<br />
<br />
It is crucial for the regime's survival to regain it as rapidly as possible.<br />
<br />
In the next installment I shall talk about the trial and conviction of the Cuban five.<br />
<br />
Cantaclaro<br />
<br />
<br />
DECEMBER 4, 2011 10:50 AM<br />
<br />
Anonymous said...<br />
<br />
The official Cuban government line is that the five Cuban agents who were tried on spying charges received excessive sentences for two reasons:<br />
<br />
1- The prosecutor pressured other codefendants who turned state evidence into accusing them of crimes they did not commit in order to receive a reduction of their sentence.<br />
<br />
2- The Miami venue of the trial exposed the jury to a lot of unfavorable community pressure and made a fair trial impossible.<br />
<br />
The first situation might have occurred but there is little proof that it could have had a significant weight in the outcome of the trial.<br />
<br />
There is evidence in the court records to indicate that the prosecutor was aware of the weakness of some of the more serious accusations for which he thought there was insufficient evidence and tried to withdraw them but was restricted from doing so by the judge.<br />
<br />
So the reason for the severe sentences does not lie in the conduct of the prosecutor but with that of the jury which throughout a very long trial was under the constant influence of a very hostile community opinion.<br />
<br />
Indeed in the court records there are jury complaints presented to the judge that their photographs were being taken as they left the court and that their license plate numbers were also being recorded and being published in the communities spanish newspapers.<br />
<br />
Moreover, these were constantly making hostile comments against the accused and drumming up community public opinion against them all along the prolongued trial.<br />
<br />
When the testimony was concluded, after a very short deliberation, the jury convicted the defendants on all counts including those that the District Attorney had attempted to withdraw because he thought he had insufficient proof.<br />
<br />
Cantaclaro<br />
<br />
<br />
DECEMBER 5, 2011 12:31 PM<br />
<br />
Anonymous said...<br />
<br />
With respect to Gross, whatever we might think about the fact that Cuban law restricts people's right to have access to the internet and to be informed, it is a fact that the introduction and distribution of the software and hardware he brought to Cuba had been prohibited and that he broke this law.<br />
<br />
Therefore, although this goes against the right of the Cuban population to be informed, the Cuban government had every legal right to convict him for this "crime".<br />
<br />
Now the Cuban government is evidently using him as a negotiating chip and is not going to let him go until they get their five agents back.<br />
<br />
However, this does not mean that they are proposing a one to five swap.<br />
<br />
Obviously they are willing to negotiate and are willing to throw in other political prisoners to close the deal.<br />
<br />
The Obama administration, on the other hand, seems to be in a lose lose situation in an election year.<br />
<br />
If it does not get Alan Gross back it will probably loose part of the Jewish vote and part of the vote of the rest of the electorate because it will be accused by its Republican opponents of being weak and allowing itself to be pushed around by a third world dictatorship.<br />
<br />
On the other hand, if it swaps the five Cuban agents for Gross, it will keep the Jewish vote but loose part of the Cuban vote and part of the vote of the general population because its opponents will accuse it of giving in to blackmail from a weak third world country dictatorship.<br />
<br />
Since the Jewish vote is more important to the Obama administration than the Cuban vote, which is predominantly Republican anyway, the Democratic administration will probably want to strike a deal with the Cuban government that will allow Gross and the five Cuban agents to return to their countries before next year's November election.<br />
<br />
However, it can not afford to make a one for five deal because this would give credence to the blackmail accusation and cost it votes among the non Jewish and non Cuban electorate. <br />
<br />
Thus it is forced to attempt to get some other goodies to even the basic one for five deal deal to give less weight to the blackmail accusation and allow it to save face with the voters.<br />
<br />
What those other goodies will be is what is probably being negotiated under the table at present by both governments at present.<br />
<br />
The Cubans are probably willing to throw in two Cuban Americans accused of an armed invasion of the island, several Cuban convicted CIA agents, other Cuban political prisoners and even two Salvadoreans convicted of participating or planning terrorist activities that took place in Cuba.<br />
<br />
The problem is many of these other possible assets, given their rap sheet, might not be palatable to the US government.<br />
<br />
However, something will probably be finally worked out before the November 2012 Presidential Elections.<br />
<br />
The timing of the swap will probably depend on the convenience of the Obama administration.<br />
<br />
The Cuban government is probably ready to carry out the swap at anytime since it will strengthen its public support and will open the door to new negotiations that could ease the effects of the US embargo.<br />
<br />
The deal will probably take place much earlier and further away from November of 2012 if the Obama political advisors expect the net effect on voters to be unfavorable for the democrats and closer to the date of the elections otherwise to allow the results to be less harmful in the first case or more beneficial in the second for the Obama administration.<br />
<br />
CantaclaroJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-23329693245431328262011-12-08T20:41:00.002-05:002011-12-08T20:41:47.896-05:00National Council of Churches Cuba TripU.S. churches will continue to press <br />
for Cuba-U.S. normalization, Kinnamon says<br />
<br />
After 53-year embargo, NCC churches ‘live in hope’ of reconciliation<br />
<br />
by Jerry L. Van Marter<br />
Presbyterian News Service<br />
<br />
HAVANA, Cuba ― The National Council of Churches in the U.S.A. (NCC) will continue to press for normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba, an end to the 53-year-old U.S. embargo of Cuba and release of the “Cuban Five” held in U.S. prisons, NCC General Secretary Michael Kinnamon told a packed press conference here Dec. 2.<br />
<br />
Kinnamon, speaking at the conclusion of a week-long visit by 15 U.S. religious leaders, told the crowd of Cuban and international journalists “we come not as politicians or diplomats but as religious leaders. Our first responsibility is to pray for the leaders of both countries and we will … but our churches represent 50 million Christians, so we believe we have some influence and we’ll use it.”<br />
<br />
Everyone the delegation spoke with ― from Cuban President Raul Castro to the head of the U.S. government’s Cuban Interest Section here, John Caulfield ― expressed the desire to end the embargo. “The question,” Kinnamon said, “is how to get there.”<br />
<br />
Castro, Kinnamon said, “insisted that everything is on the table. All the Cubans require, he told me, is that talks be held in an atmosphere of mutual respect.”<br />
Kinnamon said he and Castro discussed “small steps” that can be taken: cooperation on drug and human trafficking in the Caribbean, coordinated air traffic control (communication about the 50 weekly flights currently operating between the U.S. and Cuba is done by telephone, not electronic tracking), weather monitoring and improved telecommunications.<br />
<br />
The chances of even small steps to improve Cuba-U.S. relations “are complicated in an election year,” Kinnamon conceded, “but I am a person of faith so I always live in hope,” adding that “since 1968 the position of the NCC (on normalization) has been strong and consistent, taken out of our faith position of reconciliation.”<br />
<br />
The NCC will continue to press for a review of the sentences ― anywhere from 20 years to life ― levied against the Cuban Five, who were convicted of espionage in the U.S. even though they were monitoring the activities of Cuban expatriate counterrevolutionaries plotting against the Cuban government.<br />
<br />
Numerous international human rights organizations have branded the sentences ― four of the five have been imprisoned for 13 years; the fifth, Rene Gonzalez, was “freed” this fall to stringent “supervised release” and is not allowed to leave Florida ― unjust. Kinnamon said “they should not have been tried.”<br />
<br />
Of more immediate concern to the churches, Kinnamon said, is the ability of family members to visit the imprisoned Cubans, at least two of whom are U.S. citizens. Two of the wives and all of the men’s children have never been allowed to visit them in prison. “We ache with them for this situation that weighs so heavily,” he said.<br />
<br />
Kinnamon said he also raised with Castro the situation of American Alan Gross, who has been held in a Cuban prison for more than a year for allegedly smuggling illegal telecommunications equipment onto the island. “[Members of the NCC delegation] met with Alan Gross and talked about his sense of being unjustly accused and about his concern for his family, several members of which are seriously ill, including his daughter with cancer,” Kinnamon said.<br />
<br />
“I raised the Alan Gross case with President Castro,” Kinnamon said. “I am not here to pass judgment but I care about him as a person ― the humanitarian issue.”<br />
<br />
Kinnamon said that while political and human rights discussions occupied some of the delegation’s time, “the primary purpose of our visit has been to be in communion and conversation with our church partners here in Cuba.” Kinnamon praised the Cuban Council of Churches, saying that “U.S. churches need the Cuban churches in order to feel whole and complete.”<br />
<br />
In times of economic transition in Cuba and “economic tensions” in the U.S., “it is the call to the churches of both countries to offer a word of hope in response to the anxiety and fear in both countries.”<br />
<br />
Contact NCC News Service: 212-870-2228 | E-mail mailto:pjenks@ncccusa.org | <br />
<br />
http://www.ncccusa.org/news/111208pressconference.htmlJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-6101491042273357182011-09-30T11:41:00.003-05:002011-09-30T12:15:38.734-05:00President Obama Loses Way on Cuba<b>September 12 meeting with Hispanic journalists</b><br />
<br />
QUESTION: Richardson is right now trying to get access and the liberation of Alan Gross. His detention came in the middle of your efforts to try to change a little the US policy towards Cuba. What’s the situation with Gross right now, how far might this case torpedo somehow your visions for that change of policy and are you disappointed with Cuba’s response to your steps?<br />
<br />
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Richardson is acting as a private citizen on a humanitarian mission to try to free Gross. We’ve said repeatedly that Mr. Gross should be free, that <b>the conviction was not based on evidence or rule of law</b> [1], also that there is an humanitarian issue here involved given Gross precarious health. So <b>anything to get Mr. Gross free we will support</b> [2], although Mr. Richardson does not represent the US government in his actions there.<br />
<br />
More broadly, <b>the policy we have had to facilitate additional remittances and travel for family to Cuba, we continue to think is the right one</b> [3]. <br />
<br />
It empowers Cubans inside of Cuba who are able to have other sources of income, meet their families, get new ideas and exposure to what’s going on outside of Cuba. We think it creates more space inside Cuba for freedom and civil liberties. <br />
<br />
The Cuban government has said that it wants to transition, to loosen up the economy, so that businesses can operate more freely. <b>We have not seen evidence that they have been sufficiently aggressive in changing their policies economically, and they certainly have not been aggressive enough when it comes to freeing political prisoners</b> [4] and giving people the opportunity to speak their minds [5].<br />
<br />
And when you think of what’s happening around the world, everywhere people are crying out for freedom, you are seeing enormous changes taking place in the Middle East just in the span of 6 months, you are seeing there are almost no authoritarian communist countries left in the world and here you have this small island that is a throwback to the 60s. [6] Obviously is not working for them, the standard of living has not improved significantly, in fact they are deteriorating. [7] In many cases, peoples’ liberties continue to be constrained at a time when the world is more open and people have more information than ever before. <br />
<br />
So it’s clearly time for the Cuban regime to change. Whether they are going to seize that opportunity, so far we have not seen the kind of evidence that we’d like to see, but that change is going to take place. [8]<br />
<br />
(unofficial transcript by a participating journalist)<br />
<br />
****************************<br />
<br />
<b>September 28, 2011 Remarks by the President in an "Open for Questions" Roundtable</b><br />
<br />
MS. MEDINA: This next question is about Cuba, and it comes from Florida: What is your position regarding Cuba and the embargo? What should the Cuban people expect from you and your government during the remainder of your term, and in the future if you’re reelected?<br />
<br />
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what we did with respect to Cuba was recognize that the Cuban people now have not enjoyed freedom for 50 years, and everywhere else in the world you’ve been seeing a democratization movement that has been pressing forward. <b>Throughout Latin America, democracies have emerged from previously authoritarian regimes. The time has come for the same thing to happen in Cuba.</b> [9]<br />
<br />
Now, what we’ve tried to do is to send a signal that <b>we are open to a new relationship with Cuba if the Cuban government starts taking the proper steps</b> to open up its own country and its own -- and provide the space and the respect for human rights that would allow the Cuban people to determine their own destiny. [10]<br />
<br />
I changed the remittance laws so that family members could more easily send money back to Cuba, because that would give them more power and it would create a economic space for them to prosper. Within Cuba we have changed the family travel laws so that they can travel more frequently, as well as laws that relate to educational travel. [11]<br />
<br />
And so we’ve made these modifications that send a signal that we’re prepared to show flexibility and not be stuck in a Cold War mentality dating back to when I was born. [12] On the other hand, <b>we have to see a signal</b> back from the Cuban government that it is following through on releasing political prisoners, [13] on providing people their basic human rights, <b>in order for us to be fully engaged with them</b>. And <b>so far, at least, what we haven’t seen is the kind of genuine spirit of transformation inside of Cuba that would justify us eliminating the embargo</b>. [14]<br />
<br />
I don’t know what will happen over the next year, but we are prepared to see what happens in Cuba. <b>If we see positive movement we will respond in a positive way.</b> Hopefully, over the next five years, we will see Cuba looking around the world and saying, we need to catch up with history. [15] <b>And as long as I’m President I will always be prepared to change our Cuba policy if and when we start seeing a serious intention on the part of the Cuban government to provide liberty for its people.</b> [16] But that’s always my watchword, is are we seeing freedom for the Cuban people to live lives of opportunity and prosperity. If we are, then we’ll be supportive of them.<br />
<br />
MR. LERNER: Those conditions will suffice -- human rights, free political prisoners? No demand for a change in the economic structure, for example?<br />
<br />
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it’s very hard to separate liberty from some economic reforms. If people have no way to eat other than through the government, then the government ends up having very strict control over them, and they can be punished in all sorts of ways for expressing their own opinions. <b>That’s not to say that a condition for us releasing the embargo would be that they have a perfect market system, because obviously we have trade and exchanges with a number of countries that fall short of a liberal democracy.</b> [17]<br />
<br />
But there is a basic, I think, recognition of people’s human rights that includes their right to work, to change jobs, to get an education, to start a business. So some elements of freedom are included in how an economic system works. <b>And right now, we haven’t seen any of that.</b> [18]<br />
<br />
But let me just say this. Obviously <b>if we saw a release of political prisoners, the ability for people to express their opinions and to petition their government, if we saw even those steps those would be very significant, and we would pay attention and we would undoubtedly reexamine our overall approach to Cuba if we saw a serious movement in that direction.</b> [19]<br />
<br />
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/28/remarks-president-open-questions-roundtable<br />
<br />
****************************<br />
<br />
<br />
<i><b>My comment, posted to ABC blog</b><br />
<br />
What if Cuba demanded that the US have free health care and higher education like it does, or ended use of the death penalty and runaway gun use, before it was “open to a new relationship”?<br />
<br />
President Obama has either fallen into a 100 year old trap of assuming that the US has the right to shape Cuba’s domestic polity or is just looking for excuses.<br />
<br />
He is badly informed about what is happening inside Cuba today. <br />
<br />
Thanks to the assistance of Spain and the Catholic church, all persons deemed prisoners of conscience have been released. Those still imprisoned are guilty of violent crimes, including hijacking. China and Saudi Arabia and other countries have more serious problems of repression than Cuba does but that does not inhibit our bilateral relations with them.<br />
<br />
Cuba is in the early stages of transforming its economy and social system, similar to the first steps in China and Vietnam, but the direction is clear as every serious international reporter has documented. Obama could be taking positive steps to foster change instead of buying into the politics of the minority of hard liners in the Cuban American community who cannot recognize or tolerate self-directed evolution.<br />
<br />
The President has acted forcefully on Cuban American travel and remittances but timidly on restoring the rights of the rest of us.<br />
<br />
Cuba is one more issue where the excitement of campaign promises to meet with US opponents for real dialog has been replaced by tired rhetoric of conditionality.<br />
<br />
John McAuliff<br />
Fund for Reconciliation and Development</i><br />
<br />
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/09/obama-open-to-a-new-relationship-with-cuba/John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-39822318985870647452011-07-07T22:25:00.001-05:002011-07-09T09:02:17.597-05:00Ros Lehtinen Letter on Sex Traficking and excerpts from US reportJune 28, 2011<br />
The Honorable Hillary R. Clinton<br />
Secretary<br />
U.S. Department of State<br />
Washington, DC 20521<br />
Dear Secretary Clinton:<br />
In light of the recent publication of the 2011 Trafficking In Persons Report, once again, Cuba ranks as a Tier 3 country. Cuba has been a Tier 3 country since 2003 as the regime continues to sexually exploit women, children, and oppresses the Cuban people. Due to the fact that the Cuban regime has not shown any progress regarding trafficking of persons, I would urge the administration, within all applicable rules and guidelines, to reverse its current policy and suspend all educational and cultural exchanges with the Cuban regime pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. <br />
According to U.S. law, “countries on Tier 3 may not receive funding for government employees’ participation in educational and cultural exchange programs.” Under the repressive Cuban regime, anyone who is involved in cultural and educational exchanges are direct employees of Raul and Fidel Castro. The tyrants use these exchanges as a political instrument to promote their communist agenda while maintaining absolute control over the daily lives of the Cuban people.<br />
Last year, President Obama granted a partial waiver for Cuba to allow funding for educational and cultural exchanges. However, according to the 2011 report, the Cuban regime “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.” This report clearly illustrates the failure of the Obama administration’s partial waiver, particularly last year’s, to improve or enhance the lives of the Cuban people. <br />
These exchanges only serve as a propaganda tool for the authoritative Castro brothers and do not help bring freedom and democracy to Cuba.<br />
Thank you for your attention to this important matter.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN<br />
Chairman<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/">Full text</a> of annual report on trafficking from the State Department:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Tier Placements<br />
<br />
OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS<br />
Trafficking in Persons Report 2011<br />
[Introductory Material also available in Chinese | French | Russian | Spanish | Arabic | Persian]<br />
<br />
TIER 1<br />
Countries whose governments fully comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards.<br />
<br />
TIER 2<br />
Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards.<br />
<br />
TIER 2 WATCH LIST<br />
Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards AND:<br />
<br />
a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing;<br />
b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or<br />
c) The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year.<br />
<br />
TIER 3<br />
Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.<br />
<br />
Full list of tier <a href="http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164228.htm">placements</a><br />
<br />
<br />
CUBA (Tier 3)<br />
<br />
Cuba is a source country for adults and some children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Some Cuban medical professionals assigned to work abroad have claimed that their passports were retained as a means of keeping them in a state of exploitation, thus preventing them from traveling freely. Prostitution of children reportedly occurs in Cuba as prostitution is not criminalized for anyone above 16 years old. The scope of trafficking within Cuba is particularly difficult to gauge due to the closed nature of the government and sparse non-governmental or independent reporting.<br />
<br />
The Government of Cuba does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so. The government did not publicize information about government measures to address human trafficking through prosecution, protection, or prevention efforts during the reporting period.<br />
<br />
Recommendations for Cuba: Investigate reports of involuntary labor of Cuban citizens; in partnership with trafficking victim specialists, ensure adults and children have access to specialized trafficking victim protection and assistance; take measures to ensure identified sex and labor trafficking victims are not punished for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked; and publicize measures to address human trafficking through prosecution, protection, or prevention efforts.<br />
<br />
Prosecution<br />
<br />
The Government of Cuba did not report discernible progress on investigating or prosecuting trafficking offenses or convicting and punishing trafficking offenders during the reporting period. Cuba appears to prohibit most forms of trafficking activity through various provisions of its penal code; however, the use of these provisions could not be verified, and prostitution of children over the age of 16 is legal, leaving children over 16 particularly vulnerable to commercial sexual exploitation. The government did not share official data relating to Cuban investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of trafficking offenders, including any officials complicit in human trafficking, in 2010 or any other year. The government did not report any anti-trafficking training provided to officials.<br />
<br />
Protection<br />
<br />
The government did not publicize official data on protection of trafficking victims during the reporting period. The government did not report any procedures in place to guide officials in proactively identifying trafficking victims in vulnerable groups (such as people in prostitution) and referring them to available services. The government operates at least two well-regarded facilities for the treatment of children who have been sexually and physically abused. In addition, the government operates a nationwide network of shelters for victims of domestic violence or child abuse, but the government did not verify if trafficking victims received treatment in these centers. Adult victims reportedly reside in these shelters voluntarily. The government provided no evidence that it encouraged trafficking victims to assist in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenders. The government did not report on the existence of any procedures to ensure identified trafficking victims were not punished for crimes committed as a direct result of being trafficked.<br />
<br />
Prevention<br />
<br />
To date, the government has made limited anti-trafficking prevention efforts. The government did not implement any known public awareness campaigns to prevent forced labor or forced prostitution. The government did not report the existence of an anti-trafficking task force, monitoring mechanism, or anti-trafficking action plan. Transparency was lacking in the government’s trafficking-related policies and activities; it did not report publicly on its efforts. The government made no known efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex. The government has not reported identification of a child sex tourism problem involving its nationals or within Cuba. Cuba is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.<br />
<br />
<br />
THAILAND (Tier 2 Watch List)<br />
<br />
Thailand is a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children who are subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Individuals from neighboring countries, as well as from further away such as Uzbekistan and Fiji, migrate to Thailand for reasons including to flee conditions of poverty. Migrants from Burma, who make up the bulk of migrants in Thailand, seek economic opportunity and escape from military repression. The majority of the trafficking victims identified within Thailand are migrants from Thailand’s neighboring countries who are forced, coerced, or defrauded into labor or commercial sexual exploitation; conservative estimates have this population numbering in the tens of thousands of victims. Trafficking victims within Thailand were found employed in maritime fishing, seafood processing, low-end garment production, and domestic work. Evidence suggests that the trafficking of men, women, and children in labor sectors such as commercial fisheries, fishing-related industries, and domestic work was a significant portion of all labor trafficking in Thailand.<br />
<br />
UN-affiliated NGO research made available during the year reported a significant population of trafficking victims in the country. An estimated 23 percent of all Cambodians deported by Thai authorities at the Poipet border were trafficking victims. The UN Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP) estimated that Thai authorities deport over 23,000 Cambodian trafficking victims a year. Similarly, Lao authorities reported during the year that groups of 50 to 100 Lao trafficking victims were among the thousands of Lao nationals deported by Thai authorities. An assessment of the cumulative risk of labor trafficking among Burmese migrant workers in the seafood industry in Samut Sakhon, Thailand found that 57 percent of these workers experience conditions of forced labor. An IOM report released in May 2011 noted prevalent forced labor conditions, including debt bondage, among Cambodian and Burmese individuals recruited – some forcefully or through fraud – for work in the Thai fishing industry. According to the report, Burmese, Cambodian, and Thai men were trafficked onto Thai fishing boats that traveled throughout Southeast Asia and beyond, and who remained at sea for up to several years, did not receive pay, were forced to work 18 to 20 hours per day for seven days a week, and were threatened and physically beaten. Similarly, an earlier UNIAP study found 29 of 49 (58 percent) surveyed migrant fishermen trafficked aboard Thai fishing boats had witnessed a fellow fishermen killed by boat captains in instances when they were too weak or sick to work. Fishermen typically did not have written employment contracts with their employer. Observers noted that traffickers (including labor brokers) who bring foreign victims into Thailand generally work as individuals or in unorganized groups, while those who enslave Thai victims abroad tend to be more organized. Informed observers also reported that labor brokers, some of whom facilitate or engage in trafficking, are of both Thai and foreign origin and work in networks, collaborating with employers and, at times, with law enforcement officials.<br />
<br />
Migrants, ethnic minorities, and stateless people in Thailand are at a greater risk of being trafficked than Thai nationals, and experience withholding of travel documents, migrant registration cards, and work permits by employers. Undocumented migrants remain particularly vulnerable to trafficking, due to their economic status, education level, language barriers, and lack of knowledge of Thai law. The greatest risk factor for highland women and girls to being trafficked was their lack of citizenship. Some children from neighboring countries are forced to sell flowers, beg, or work in domestic service in urban areas. During the year, Vietnamese women were found to have been confined and forced to act as surrogate mothers after being recruited for work in Bangkok. Most Thai trafficking victims abroad who were repatriated back to Thailand during the year had been exploited in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Bahrain, and China. Thai victims were also repatriated from Russia, South Africa, Yemen, Vietnam, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), and Singapore. Thai nationals are also known to be trafficked to Australia, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Timor-Leste. Some Thai men who migrate for low-skilled contract work and agricultural labor are subjected to conditions of forced labor and debt bondage. Sex trafficking generally involves victims who are women and girls. Sex tourism continues to be a problem in Thailand, and this demand likely fuels trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation. Thailand is a transit country for victims from North Korea, China, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Burma destined for third countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Russia, Western Europe, South Korea, and the United States. There were reports that separatist groups recruited teenaged children to carry out attacks.<br />
<br />
The Government of Thailand does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. The government continued implementation of its human trafficking law and conducted awareness-raising activities on human trafficking. The government continued work on its implementation of regulations that will allow trafficking victims to temporarily live and work within Thailand, though victims generally continue to be detained in government shelters. The Thai prime minister chaired meetings with labor and civil society organizations to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts, which led to the development of the Thai government’s second six-year National Policy Strategy on human trafficking for 2011-2016. In July 2010, the prime minister publicly acknowledged the need to improve the government’s weak interagency coordination in addressing human trafficking. The Thai government reported increases in trafficking prosecutions and convictions, but as of May 2011 there was insufficient data available to determine whether each of these could be categorized as human trafficking convictions. Despite these significant efforts, the government has not shown sufficient evidence of increasing efforts to address human trafficking over the previous year, particularly in the areas of prosecuting and convicting both sex and labor trafficking offenders, combating trafficking complicity of public officials, and trafficking victim protection; therefore, Thailand is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for a second consecutive year. Given the significant scope and magnitude of trafficking in Thailand, there continued to be a low number of convictions for both sex and labor trafficking, and of victims identified among vulnerable populations. Direct involvement in and facilitation of human trafficking by law enforcement officials reportedly remained a significant problem in Thailand; authorities reported investigating two cases of complicity involving four officials, including at the police colonel level, though there were no convictions or sentences of complicit officials during the year. The government did not respond to multiple reports of widespread corruption involving the extortion and trafficking of Burmese deportees from Thailand. NGOs reported that problems hindering the government’s anti-trafficking efforts included local police corruption, biases against migrant laborers, the lack of a comprehensive monitoring system of the government’s efforts, lack of understanding among local officials of trafficking, the courts’ lack of a human rights-based approach to labor abuse cases, and systematic disincentives for trafficking victims to be identified. Authorities continued efforts to prevent human trafficking with assistance from international organizations and NGOs, but have not yet adequately addressed structural vulnerabilities to trafficking created by its migrant labor policies. The government should continue to increase its efforts given the significant scope and magnitude of trafficking in Thailand.<br />
<br />
Recommendations for Thailand: Enhance ongoing efforts to identify victims of trafficking among vulnerable populations, in particular undocumented migrants and deportees; increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict both sex and labor trafficking offenders; improve efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict officials engaged in trafficking-related corruption; ensure that offenders of fraudulent labor recruitment and of forced labor receive stringent criminal penalties; improve labor inspection standards and procedures to better detect workplace violations, including instances of trafficking; improve implementation of procedures to allow all adult trafficking victims to travel, work, and reside outside of shelters; provide legal alternatives to the removal of trafficking victims to countries in which they would face retribution or hardship; implement mechanisms to allow adult foreign trafficking victims to reside in Thailand; make greater efforts to educate migrant workers on their rights, their employers’ obligations to them, legal recourse available to victims of trafficking, and how to seek remedies against traffickers; improve efforts to regulate fees and brokers associated with the process to legalize migrant workers in order to reduce the vulnerability of migrants to human trafficking; and increase anti-trafficking awareness efforts directed at employers and clients of the sex trade.<br />
<br />
Prosecution<br />
<br />
The Thai government made mixed progress in its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts during the reporting period. Thailand’s 2008 anti-trafficking law criminally prohibits all forms of trafficking and prescribes penalties from four to 10 years’ imprisonment – penalties that are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave offenses, such as rape. The Thai government reported 18 convictions in trafficking-related cases in 2010 – an increase from eight known convictions during the previous year; as of May 2011, only five of the 18 convictions reported by the government could be confirmed to be for trafficking offenses. The government also reported initiating 79 prosecutions in 2010, up from 17 prosecutions during the previous year. The police reported investigating 70 trafficking-related cases in 2010, including at least 49 cases of forced prostitution and 11 for forced labor. This compares to the 95 trafficking-related investigations reported in 2009. Very few cross-border labor exploitation investigations led to arrests of alleged traffickers, and even those arrested rarely found themselves prosecuted in court. A study released during the year on the trafficking of fishermen in Thailand found that investigations of alleged human trafficking on Thai fishing boats, as well as inspections of these boats, were practically nonexistent, according to surveyed fisherman, NGOs, and government officials. The justice system remained slow in its handling of criminal cases, including trafficking cases. Additionally, frequent personnel changes hampered the government’s ability to make greater progress on anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. In December 2010, the police anti-trafficking unit, with assistance from NGOs, raided an apartment in Bangkok and removed 12 Uzbek trafficking victims, successfully identifying some of the victims; others who were likely also victims were returned to the streets or taken to Thai immigration for deportation, depending on their visa status. The alleged trafficker, an Uzbek woman, was initially jailed during a police investigation, but in February obtained bail and has reportedly resumed her involvement in Bangkok’s sex industry. In January 2011, a senior police anti-trafficking officer involved in the investigation of the Uzbek trafficking ring, along with two subordinates, were placed on temporary suspension for allegations of corrupt practices.<br />
<br />
The Court of Justice reported that the number of cases it adjudicated involving violations of the 2008 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act has gradually increased since the law came into force. Sentences for convicted offenders in confirmed trafficking cases ranged from four to 20 years’ imprisonment. In December, a Thai court convicted three defendants in the 2006 Ranya Paew case involving forced labor of Burmese workers in a shrimp processing factory and sentenced them each to 20 years in prison, the maximum penalty under the relevant Thai law; the offenders remain released pending the results of their appeal. In October, a Thai court sentenced a Thai woman to four years’ imprisonment for operating a fraudulent employment agency involved in the trafficking of Thai workers abroad. Media outlets highlighted several arrests in sex trafficking cases. Thai law enforcement authorities cooperated with counterparts from around the world, leading to arrests and convictions of traffickers. Some observers believe that more needs to be done to arrest traffickers within Thailand through cross-border investigations.<br />
<br />
Corruption remained widespread among Thai law enforcement personnel, creating an enabling environment for human trafficking to prosper. Allegations of trafficking-related corruption persisted during the year, including in cases of forced prostitution and forced labor of migrants. There were credible reports that officials protected brothels, other commercial sex venues, and seafood and sweatshop facilities from raids and inspections. In addition to well-known corruption of local-level police officers, there were also protective relationships between central-level specialist police officers and the trafficking hot-spot regions to which they were assigned. There was no information indicating tolerance for trafficking at an institutional level. The Department of Special Investigations reported investigating four policemen, undertaking some disciplinary action, for trafficking-related complicity during the year; these investigations were ongoing. The government did not respond to reports that Thai officials were involved in the trafficking of Burmese men, women, and children deported to the hands of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). Authorities also have not responded to reports that Thai police and immigration officials extort money or sex from Burmese citizens detained in Thailand for immigration violations, and sell Burmese unable to pay to labor brokers and sex traffickers. The government continued efforts to train thousands of police, labor, prosecutors, social workers, and immigration officials on victim identification.<br />
<br />
Protection<br />
<br />
The Thai government demonstrated limited efforts to identify and protect foreign and Thai victims of trafficking during the year. The Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MSDHS) reported that 381 foreign victims were classified as trafficking victims in Thailand and received assistance at government shelters during the year, a decrease from the 530 foreign victims assisted in 2009. More than half of the victims assisted during the year were from Laos, and one fourth from Burma. The government continued to repatriate foreign victims of trafficking, including through regular coordination with Lao and Burmese authorities. MSDHS reported that in 2010, 88 Thai nationals were classified as trafficking victims abroad and were repatriated to Thailand with assistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the UAE, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Bahrain, China, Russia, South Africa, Yemen, Vietnam, the U.S., the UK, and Singapore. This represented a significant decrease from the 309 Thai trafficking victims repatriated from abroad in 2009. The government reported increasing efforts to identify victims of trafficking among vulnerable populations through screening checkpoints at airports and border crossings. However, given the reportedly significant population of trafficking victims in Thailand out of which only 52 trafficking victims were reported identified in immigration detention centers, the government should continue to improve these efforts.<br />
<br />
The government provided limited incentives for victims to participate in the investigation and prosecution of their traffickers. The Thai government continued to refer victims to one of nine regional shelters run by MSDHS, where they receive counseling, limited legal assistance, and medical care. Foreign adult victims of trafficking identified by authorities continued to be detained in government shelters and typically cannot opt to reside outside of a shelter or leave before Thai authorities are prepared to repatriate them. The 2008 law contains a provision for granting foreign victims the right to seek employment while awaiting conclusion of legal processes, and the Thai government passed a new regulation in May 2011 to implement this provision. The government passed new regulations that will allow foreign victims to temporarily live and work within Thailand. As a result of this detention practice, foreign victims of trafficking are not afforded the same opportunities as other foreign nationals who seek and receive permission to work in Thailand. There were regular reports during the year of foreign trafficking victims who fled shelters, likely due to slow legal and repatriation processes, the inability to earn income during trial proceedings, language barriers, and distrust of government officials. There were reported instances in which victims opted not to seek designation as trafficking victims due to systemic disincentives, such as long stays in shelters during lengthy repatriation and court processes. NGOs reported that some individuals were trained by labor brokers on how to lie to government officials to prevent being identified as victims. Thai law protects victims from being prosecuted for acts committed as a result of being trafficked. However, some victims were likely punished due to the lack of effective victim identification procedures and authorities’ efforts to arrest and deport immigration violators.<br />
<br />
The government generally encourages victims to participate in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking, though some victims opt not to do so. There was no evidence during the reporting period that the government offered legal aid to encourage workers to avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain compensatory damages from employers in cases of forced labor. High legal costs, language, bureaucratic, and immigration barriers, fear of retribution by traffickers, distrust of Thai officials, slow legal processes, and the financial needs of victims effectively prevented most victims from participating in the Thai legal process. While in the past, authorities have assisted trafficking victims receive financial compensation from their trafficking offenders in a few cases, there were no such reported cases during the year. The lack of labor law coverage for fishermen in Thailand under the Labor Protection Act of 1998 makes this population particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Despite a 2005 cabinet resolution that established that foreign trafficking victims in Thailand who are stateless residents can be given residency status on a case-by-case basis, the Thai government has yet to report granting residency status to a foreign trafficking victim.<br />
<br />
Prevention<br />
<br />
The Thai government made notable efforts to prevent human trafficking, including through collaboration with international organizations and NGOs. Some prevention efforts included the involvement of the prime minister and members of his cabinet. While some activities aimed to raise awareness on trafficking within Thai society as a whole, others attempted to raise awareness among targeted high-risk industries. The government reported that throughout 2010 and early 2011, it reached more than 3,000 people from high-risk groups to raise awareness on trafficking, as well as approximately 2,000 employers to raise awareness on labor rights and trafficking. NGOs noted that awareness of human trafficking and labor rights grew, both among high-risk populations and government officials. The government made increased efforts to educate migrant workers on their rights and their employers’ obligations to them. The government’s Nationality Verification and Granting an Amnesty to Remain in the Kingdom of Thailand to Alien Workers Program offered inadequate legal rights to Burmese and other migrant workers and bound their immigration status to Thai employers, effectively leaving workers without legal recourse or protection from forced labor. Observers remained concerned that the process to legalize migrant workers with its associated fees, as well as costs imposed by poorly regulated and unlicensed labor brokers, increased the vulnerability of migrant workers to trafficking and debt bondage. In some cases, workers reportedly incurred debts imposed by their employers amounting to one year’s wages for the required processing of their registration. During the past year, the government worked with the Government of Burma to open a Burmese government office in Thailand, reducing the need for some undocumented Burmese workers to return to Burma, and thus making them less at risk to being exploited. The government in 2010 announced plans to collect additional funds from migrant workers undergoing nationality verification in order to underwrite the cost of deporting undocumented migrants; if enacted, this could further increase workers’ debt. In October 2010, the prime minister announced the creation of a “Centre to Suppress, Arrest and Prosecute Alien Workers Working Underground and Human Trafficking Processes.” Authorities reported partnering with NGOs and international organizations that fund interpreters to assist the government in responding to foreign language queries reposted to the hotline that receives calls regarding trafficking cases; however, the government’s decentralized call system made it difficult to ensure that localities systematically and adequately responded to calls that were diverted to them - particularly calls that came in from non-Thai callers. The government reportedly disbursed $200,000 from its fund to assist trafficking victims and finance anti-trafficking activities - only a small portion of the government’s overall fund to assist trafficking victims. In April 2010, the Thai government published its own report on the trafficking situation, its efforts to address it, trafficking statistical data, and recommendations on how to improve its operations. The government reported random interviews with Thai migrants at overland border-crossing checkpoints prevented 171 potential victims of trafficking or other exploitation from traveling. Authorities also reported “labor checkpoints” at international airports through which the Labor Ministry works with immigration authorities to randomly interview travelers who may be potential trafficking victims, though the government did not report identifying any potential or confirmed trafficking cases through these efforts. The government conducted awareness-raising campaigns targeting tourists’ demand for child sex tourism, but did not make any other efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sexual acts or forced labor. Thailand is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Tier 1)<br />
<br />
The United States is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor, debt bondage, document servitude, and sex trafficking. Trafficking occurs for commercial sexual exploitation in street prostitution, massage parlors, and brothels, and for labor in domestic service, agriculture, manufacturing, janitorial services, hotel services, hospitality industries, construction, health and elder care, and strip club dancing. Vulnerabilities are increasingly found in visa programs for legally documented students and temporary workers who typically fill labor needs in the hospitality, landscaping, construction, food service, and agricultural industries. There are allegations of domestic workers, foreign nationals on A-3 and G-5 visas, subjected to forced labor by foreign diplomatic or consular personnel posted to the United States. Combined federal and state human trafficking information indicates more sex trafficking than labor trafficking investigations and prosecutions, but law enforcement identified a comparatively higher number of labor trafficking victims as such cases uncovered recently have involved more victims. U.S. citizen victims, both adults and children, are predominantly found in sex trafficking; U.S. citizen child victims are often runaways, troubled, and homeless youth. Foreign victims are more often found in labor trafficking than sex trafficking. In 2010, the number of female foreign victims of labor trafficking served through victim services programs increased compared with 2009. The top countries of origin for foreign victims in FY 2010 were Thailand, India, Mexico, Philippines, Haiti, Honduras, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic.<br />
<br />
The U.S. government fully complies with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government sustained strong federal law enforcement efforts, strengthening support for federal task forces and initiating efforts to improve coordination and proactively identify cases. The government continued to provide funding to NGOs for services to victims and identified an increased number of victims. Immigration relief, which may lead to residency and eventual citizenship, is offered to qualified victims and immediate family members. The government sustained its prevention efforts, continuing to examine federal procurement and specific visa categories for vulnerabilities as well as to undertake public awareness efforts. The U.S. government annually reports on its activities to combat human trafficking in a report compiled by the Department of Justice available at www.justice.gov/ag/publications.htm including detailed information on funding and suggestions for improved performance.<br />
<br />
Recommendations for the United States: Improve data collection on human trafficking cases at the federal, state and local levels; continue federal partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies to encourage training, protocols, and dedicated and incentivized personnel at the state and local level; train field reporting collectors to recognize and report on human trafficking; mandate training in the detection of human trafficking for Department of Labor and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission investigators; increase the incorporation of anti-trafficking efforts into existing structures such as labor, child protection, education, housing, victim services, immigration courts, runaway/homeless youth, and juvenile justice programs; provide victim identification training for immigration detention and removal officers and conduct screening in immigration detention centers; increase funding for victim services, including legal services; offer comprehensive services to identified, eligible victims regardless of type of immigration relief sought, if any; increase training for consular officers to reduce vulnerabilities in visa programs; examine guestworker programs to reduce vulnerabilities; conduct briefings for domestic workers of foreign diplomats to ensure that they know their rights; improve oversight and enforcement of employment-based visas to forestall vulnerability and abuse; increase cooperation between the private and public sectors to encourage business practices that rid supply chains of human trafficking; and expand anti-trafficking outreach, services, and training in the insular areas.<br />
<br />
Prosecution<br />
<br />
The U.S. government demonstrated significant and sustained progress in its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts through 2010. The United States prohibits all forms of trafficking in persons through criminal statutes that were enacted almost 150 years ago in the wake of the U.S. Civil War to effectuate the Constitutional prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude. These statutes were updated and modernized by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) and subsequent legislation. Enforcement of the involuntary servitude and slavery efforts has since been carried out under the umbrella term “trafficking in persons.” U.S. law prohibits peonage, involuntary servitude, forced labor, sex trafficking, and servitude as well as confiscation or withholding of documents, such as passports. U.S. criminal law also prohibits conspiracy and attempt to violate these provisions, as well as obstructing enforcement of these provisions. Sex trafficking prosecutions involving minors do not require a showing of force, fraud, or coercion. Additional federal laws can also be utilized in trafficking prosecutions and traffickers may be convicted under those statutes instead of specific trafficking offenses.<br />
<br />
Penalties prescribed under these statutes range from five to 20 years’ imprisonment for peonage, involuntary servitude, forced labor, and domestic servitude, and up to life imprisonment for aggravating circumstances. Penalties for sex trafficking range up to life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years for sex trafficking of minors and 15 years for sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion or sex trafficking of minors under age 14. There is also a five-year maximum penalty for the related offense of fraud in foreign labor contracting under a related statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1351, which can be used in trafficking prosecutions. Under federal law, those who financially benefit through participation in a trafficking venture with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the trafficking conduct are subject to sentences equivalent to the underlying trafficking statutes. These penalties are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with penalties prescribed under U.S. law for other serious offenses, such as rape, kidnapping, or if death results from the trafficking situation.<br />
<br />
Federal trafficking offenses are investigated by federal law enforcement agencies and prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The federal government tracks its activities by Fiscal Year (FY) which runs from October 1 through September 30. In FY 2010, collectively federal law enforcement charged 181 individuals, and obtained 141 convictions in 103 human trafficking prosecutions (32 labor trafficking and 71 sex trafficking). These numbers do not reflect prosecutions of cases involving the commercial sexual exploitation of children that were brought under statutes other than the TVPA’s sex trafficking provision. This represents the largest number of federal human trafficking prosecutions initiated in a single year, including large-scale, complex cases. In FY 2010, the average prison sentence imposed for federal trafficking crimes was 11.8 years and prison terms imposed ranged from three months to 54 years. In the past year, notable federal prosecutions included the longest sentence returned in a single-victim forced labor case - a 20-year sentence for holding a woman in domestic servitude for eight years; the initiation of the largest trafficking case to date involving the exploitation of over 600 Thai agricultural workers which is pending trial; multiple cases involving the systematic nonviolent coercion of groups of documented guestworkers; a life sentence in a sex trafficking case; convictions of 10 defendants in a multinational organized criminal conspiracy that exploited guestworkers in 14 states; and a bilateral enforcement initiative with Mexico resulting in indictments of sex trafficking networks under both U.S. and Mexican law.<br />
<br />
Traffickers were also prosecuted under a myriad of state laws, but no comprehensive data is available on state prosecutions and convictions. All 50 states prohibit the prostitution of minors under state and local laws that predate the enactment of the TVPA. By the end of the reporting period, forty-five states had enacted specific anti-trafficking statutes using varying definitions and a range of penalties. Over the last decade, human trafficking cases under state statutes were initiated in 18 states. The majority of state cases involved child sex trafficking; at least three states used their state statutes for forced labor prosecutions. State laws are enforced by approximately 16,000 local, county and state agencies. While state prosecutions continue to increase, one study found that less than 10 percent of state and local law enforcement agencies surveyed had protocols or policies on human trafficking, and recommended augmented training, standard operational protocols, and dedicated personnel within police agencies.<br />
<br />
The lack of uniform nationwide data collection remained an impediment to compiling fully accurate statistics. Activities were undertaken during the reporting period to address this issue, but differing data systems used by the diverse array of enforcement agencies now partnering on human trafficking issues remain difficult to integrate. Amendments to the TVPA in 2008 tasked the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to incorporate human trafficking offenses in the annual statistics collected from police forces nationwide; development of technology to implement this mandate was underway during the reporting period and it is expected that collection will begin in early 2013. The Department of Defense (DoD) undertook a similar effort to amend its criminal data systems, but did not collect information during the reporting period. As part of their responsibilities under their federal grants, 39 task forces reported 750 investigations during the reporting period, although it is unknown how many were state versus federal investigations, how many convictions resulted, or to what extent the data included investigations that required stabilization of potential victims but that did not ultimately culminate in the official identification of victims under the TVPA.<br />
<br />
DOJ continued to fund 39 anti-trafficking task forces nationwide, each comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement investigators and prosecutors, labor enforcement, and a nongovernmental victim service provider. DOJ implemented a number of new measures to address critiques that state law enforcement participation mainly continued pre-existing programs to combat commercial vice and that the success of the task forces had varied widely. To further develop best practices, DOJ funded three Enhanced Collaboration Model Task Forces in Illinois, California, and Texas, in which state and federal law enforcement agencies and service providers addressed sex and labor trafficking whether victims were citizen or noncitizen, adult or child. DOJ, in cooperation with the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor, also announced the creation of Anti-Trafficking Coordination Teams to bring together federal investigators and prosecutors to develop and implement coordinated, proactive federal interagency investigations and prosecutions in select areas nationwide. The Department of State announced the creation of a dedicated anti-trafficking unit within the headquarters staff of the Diplomatic Security Service.<br />
<br />
Efforts continued to incorporate civil enforcement in the anti-trafficking response. The Department of Labor (DOL) carries out civil law enforcement in the nation’s workplaces and its field investigators are often the first government authorities to detect exploitative labor practices; the investigators then coordinate with other law enforcement agencies to ensure restitution on behalf of trafficking victims. DOL investigators have not yet been funded, trained, or given the mandate to focus on human trafficking cases and did not receive mandatory trafficking-specific training during the reporting period. Anti-trafficking activities have not been funded or disseminated to labor and employment agencies within state and territorial governments. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which investigates discrimination charges against employers, held a public hearing devoted to human trafficking, taking testimony on identification and remediation of trafficking cases and identifying possible future actions. DOJ began partnering with the EEOC to strengthen referrals and protocols and to develop victim identification training for EEOC attorneys and investigators. During the reporting period, the EEOC completed two investigations and filed civil actions against the alleged traffickers; two other investigations were ongoing at the close of the reporting period.<br />
<br />
There were no reports of official complicity in human trafficking during the reporting period.<br />
<br />
The U.S. government undertook considerable law enforcement training efforts during the reporting period. In collaboration with NGOs, DOJ launched an online task force resource guide, and conducted a national training for 700 task force members and law enforcement, governmental, and nongovernmental partners, which included advanced training to identify, investigate, and prosecute human trafficking cases and assist human trafficking victims. The national training conference was followed by a series of regional conferences to build upon the exchanges of expertise at the national conference. The DOJ task forces trained over 24,278 law enforcement officers and other persons likely to come into contact with human trafficking victims. The FBI provided comprehensive anti-trafficking training to over 1,000 new agents and support personnel and specialized training for agents assigned to the FBI Civil Rights squads in field offices around the country as well as training 960 state and local law enforcement officers. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided advanced training to 72 veteran U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agents and overview training to all agents attending the ICE Training Academy, and updated mandatory training for more than 40,000 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers and agents. DHS launched web-based training and continued in-person trainings that reached more than 14,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement officials during the reporting period. Information about services for human trafficking victims is included in the training offered to participating agencies in cooperative agreements following section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes state and local law enforcement agencies to carry out enforcement of certain immigration authorities related to the investigation, apprehension, and detention of unauthorized immigrants in the United States. NGOs reported instances in which noncitizen trafficking victims in 287(g) locations were fearful to report crimes. DoD continued mandatory training to its law enforcement personnel on identification, investigation, and information sharing with civilian and host nation law enforcement agencies.<br />
<br />
Protection<br />
<br />
The U.S. government demonstrated sustained protection efforts, increased numbers of victims assisted, and continued efforts to address challenges to increase identification and service provision. The U.S. government has formal procedures to guide officials in victim identification and referrals to victim services provided by NGOs, and funds an NGO-operated national hotline and referral service.<br />
<br />
The U.S. government and its federally funded trafficking victim service providers encouraged foreign national and U.S. citizen victims to assist with investigations and prosecutions. The TVPA provides two principal types of immigration relief to foreign trafficking victims: 1) continued presence, which allows temporary immigration relief and may allow work authorization for victims who are also potential witnesses in an investigation or prosecution; and 2) T nonimmigrant status or “T visas,” which allow for legal immigration status for up to four years for victims who cooperate with reasonable law enforcement requests for assistance with an investigation or prosecution. Testimony against the trafficker, conviction of the trafficker, or formal denunciation of the trafficker is not required, nor is sponsorship or approval by an investigating agency. Victims may also apply for T visas on behalf of certain family members, including spouses and unmarried children under 21, parents and minor unmarried siblings of victims under 21, and parents and minor unmarried siblings of victims 21 and over if the relative faces danger as a result of the victim’s escape from the trafficker or cooperation with law enforcement. T visa holders and their family members are authorized to work and after three years are then eligible for permanent residence status and eventual citizenship.<br />
<br />
Also available is U nonimmigrant status or a “U visa,” which allows for legal immigration status for up to four years for victims of certain crimes, including trafficking, who cooperate or are willing to cooperate with reasonable law enforcement requests in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity. An arrest, prosecution, or conviction is not required. Victims may also apply for U visas on behalf of certain family members, including spouses and minor children, and parents and minor siblings of victims under 21. U visa holders and their family members are authorized to work, and after three years are then eligible for permanent residence status and eventual citizenship.<br />
<br />
In FY 2010, continued presence was issued to 186 potential victim-witnesses, a decrease from 299 last year. T visas were granted to 447 victims and 349 immediate family members of victims, representing an increase from 313 and 273, respectively, last year. Five hundred and eighteen T visa holders, including 309 victims and 209 family members, became lawful permanent residents in FY 2010, which puts them on a path to obtaining U.S. citizenship.<br />
<br />
Unlike T visas, the number of U visas granted to trafficking victims is not tracked.<br />
<br />
Foreign nationals in the United States without a lawful immigration status generally are not eligible for federal public benefits such as food assistance and health care programs; there are exceptions, including services provided by homeless shelters and emergency medical assistance. When continued presence is granted or a potential victim has made a bona fide application for a T visa, HHS can issue a certification letter. That enables the victim to receive public benefits and services to the same extent as a refugee, which includes targeted assistance with income, health care, and employment searches as well as access to all assistance programs available to citizens. In FY 2010, 449 such certifications were issued to foreign adults and 92 eligibility letters were issued to foreign children, an increase from 330 for adults and 50 for children in FY 2009. Certified victims came from 47 countries. Primary countries of origin for foreign victims were Thailand, India, Mexico, Honduras, Philippines, Haiti, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. Fifty-five percent of foreign adult victims were labor trafficking victims, of which 70 percent were men and 30 percent were women; 12 percent were adult sex trafficking victims, all of whom were women; and 10 percent were victims of both sex and labor trafficking. Sixty-two percent of foreign child victims were labor trafficking victims, of which half were boys and half were girls; 29 percent were sex trafficking victims, of which 30 percent were boys; and nine percent were victims of both labor and sex trafficking.<br />
<br />
From July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010, DOJ and HHS provided trafficking victim assistance funding to NGOs that served at least 1,472 potential victims (foreign nationals and citizens), more than double the number served in 2009; the exact number is unknown because some victims were assisted with funding from both agencies but an unduplicated count is not available. Adult victims who were citizens, including Native Americans, are not included in the number of victims served. In 2010, DOJ released a new funding opportunity that includes a focus on adult U.S. citizen victims that can also serve Native Americans. DOJ took steps to gauge the need and the type of culturally competent services required to assist trafficked Native Americans with the hope that a pilot project can be developed in the future, and provided specialized training to law enforcement and service providers in jurisdictions serving Native American communities.<br />
<br />
Federally funded victim assistance included services coordination and referrals, medical care, dental care, mental health treatment, sustenance and shelter, translation and interpretation, immigration and legal assistance, and transportation. In FY 2010, DOJ provided grant funding to 34 NGO service providers to assist foreign nationals and six to assist U.S. citizen and lawful permanent resident victims, and HHS provided funding for services that were delivered by more than 100 NGO service providers.<br />
<br />
DOJ used an increase in victim services funding to create the Enhanced Collaborative Model Task Forces, with half of the funding applicable for services. The other half supported law enforcement investigations and coordination aimed at identifying victims. As increasing numbers of victims have been identified and assisted, HHS has directed an increasing percentage of available funding toward services for victims, their family members, and potential victims. The NGO contractor of the HHS services program reports having contributed non-government funds to support this effort.<br />
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Under the HHS services program, there is a maximum reimbursement amount allowed per month for each victim and a maximum number of months during which a victim may be assisted, with some exceptions allowed. NGOs reported cases in which the limits have been reached and they are no longer providing services to the victim before a case came to trial. However, once a victim is certified by HHS or, in the case of a minor, receives an eligibility letter from HHS, that individual is eligible for services, including income supports, health care, and social services, through the provider network that assists refugees resettle in the United States. While legal services are often crucial to access civil and immigration remedies and undertake the advocacy necessary to navigate the complex federal system of benefits and the justice system, the HHS services program does not allow reimbursement for immigration legal assistance. In 2010, DOJ extended its program to offer this assistance. Should a foreign national victim decide not to report the crime or comply with reasonable law enforcement requests, DOJ and HHS funded services must in most cases be terminated; approval for continuation on a case-by-case basis is sometimes granted, and the law provides an exception to the cooperation requirement where physical or psychological trauma renders a victim unable to participate in an investigation or prosecution. Services under the HHS services program must be discontinued if an adult victim pursues long-term immigration relief other than the T visa.<br />
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NGOs reported isolated incidents of officers citing victims risking withdrawal of benefits when faced with reluctant victims; NGOs also reported continued challenges in getting law enforcement to recognize reluctant victims for protection purposes. Law enforcement continued to face challenges in identifying child victims of sex trafficking, particularly because the victims are often provided false identification by their traffickers and at least initially self-identified as adults. There was no targeted federal funding to support state child welfare agencies’ anti-trafficking efforts. In some states, state child welfare agencies’ missions did not formally extend to human trafficking, focusing instead on children who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected by caretakers and have not been expanded to reflect the anti-trafficking policy developments of the last decade. NGOs reported that these programs generally did not assist children over 14 years of age. State and local law enforcement, in some jurisdictions, was hampered by a lack of mandates, protocols, and training to identify and respond to child trafficking victims. The challenge of incorporating modern anti-trafficking concepts into these existing institutions has resulted in misidentification and referrals to juvenile justice or immigration systems rather than protective services. During the reporting period, the states of Illinois, Georgia, New York, Connecticut, and Florida created new procedures to increase identification or conducted initiatives to train child protection workers on human trafficking.<br />
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When an unaccompanied child (UAC) comes to the attention of federal authorities, those children are usually put into the care and custody of HHS, Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), Division of Unaccompanied Children’s Services (DUCS). DUCS screens UACs to identify potential victims of trafficking. UACs who may be trafficking victims are referred to the ORR Anti-Trafficking in Persons Division (ATIP) for an eligibility determination. If the UAC is found to be a trafficking victim by ORR/ATIP, they are eligible for federal long-term foster care through the same program that cares for unaccompanied refugee minors who come to the United States. UACs who are not determined to be victims of trafficking by ORR/ATIP remain in the ORR/DUCS program until they reunify with a sponsor in the United States, age-out of care, return to their home country, or adjust their legal immigration status. Children may also be referred directly to ORR/ATIP for assistance without being placed in the ORR/DUCS program. Sometimes service providers believe a child may be a trafficking victim but HHS cannot substantiate the claim.<br />
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A study of UACs in immigration proceedings, a population vulnerable to trafficking, indicated a substantial gap between the number of children service providers identified as victims and the number of children who received federal benefits. For those unaccompanied children who may be trafficking victims and in deportation proceedings, the 2008 amendment of the TVPA allows for procedural protections such as access to counsel and child advocates. HHS funds projects to coordinate pro bono legal assistance and child advocates. Funding of direct counsel is not permitted, and not all of these children are matched with a pro bono attorney that is willing to volunteer their time to represent the child. In practice, child advocates are not always provided for these children as child advocate programs are only available in few areas due to funding constraints.<br />
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While federal, state and local grant programs exist for vulnerable children, including those who are on the streets, NGOs reported that identified child trafficking victims faced difficulties accessing needed services. HHS-funded short-term shelter programs served 44,000 homeless and runaway youth and more than 800,000 youth received contact from an HHS-funded street outreach worker, but these programs require training and specialized services to be able to identify and assist child trafficking victims. HHS conducted training for runaway and homeless youth services in an effort to fill this gap. Additionally, the executive branch proposed additional funding for training within the runaway and homeless youth system to identify, prevent and address sex trafficking of minors. DOJ continued grants for services coordination, technical assistance, and comprehensive services to U.S. citizen child victims of both sex and labor trafficking; 45 citizen child victims received services through this program.<br />
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In 2010, the United States’ Return, Reintegration, and Family Reunification Program for Victims of Trafficking reunited 165 family members with trafficked persons in the United States and assisted three victims in returning to their country of origin. In September, 2010, due to lack of funding, the program was suspended; approximately 89 individuals are on a waiting list for assistance, unable to reunify with their family members in the United States.<br />
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While the TVPA sets forth a federal victim protection framework and principles that covers victims in all 50 states and territories, such protections were not also codified in most state laws. Nine of 50 states, as well as Washington, DC, offered state-funded public benefits to trafficking victims; 18 permitted victims to bring civil lawsuits; seven encouraged law enforcement to provide supporting documentation for T visa applications; 21 instituted mandatory restitution; and nine required that victims’ names and/or locations be kept confidential. DOJ took positive steps to eliminate barriers, educate administrators, and encourage the states to use the federal Crime Victims Fund to fund mainstream crime victim service providers to assist trafficking victims.<br />
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The TVPA provides that victims should not be inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. NGOs reported identifying increased numbers of potential victims in deportation proceedings and immigration detention. The prostitution of children has traditionally been handled by some state governments as a vice crime or a juvenile justice issue, and the anti-trafficking approach of the TVPA has been slow to fully permeate the state juvenile justice system. DOJ made efforts to engage state juvenile justice professionals in order to increase identification of minor trafficking victims and has trained state prosecutors. In 2009, the most recent year for which data is available, 235 males and 844 females under 18 years of age were reported to the FBI as having been arrested for prostitution and commercialized vice, an increase from 206 males and 643 females in 2008. Jurisdictions continued to formulate varying responses to help decrease arrests and view trafficked persons as victims; several states passed laws decriminalizing children found in prostitution, diverting arrested children into shelters and services, or allowing prostitution convictions to be expunged.<br />
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DHS hired six additional Victim Assistance Specialists nationwide, bringing the total to 18 human trafficking specialists and 250 generalists who are trained on the issue. All asylum field offices conducted training on identifying trafficking victims in the context of affirmative asylum adjudications, and this training is required for all incoming asylum officers. CBP has mandatory training and protocols in place to screen unaccompanied children for trafficking victimization. A study reported that the screenings are not effective because they are not conducted in a child appropriate manner by child welfare specialists in appropriate facilities. As in the last reporting period, detention and removal officers did not receive training on victim identification and did not conduct screenings in immigration detention centers. HHS conducted online trainings on identification, outreach and services and the HHS hotline center conducted general awareness and identification trainings nationwide. The Department of Education increased efforts to provide educational resources to school districts to help them prevent, identify and respond to human trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation of children, training chiefs of school police forces and surveying school districts for promising practices that can be disseminated nationwide. States have not yet created programs to increase awareness or identification within schools.<br />
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Prevention<br />
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The U.S. government made significant progress on addressing prevention throughout the reporting period, continuing efforts to ensure government procurement is free from forced labor, examine visa categories for vulnerabilities, and conduct public awareness activities. The Cabinet-level President’s Interagency Task Force (PITF) is statutorily directed to coordinate federal efforts to combat trafficking in persons. The Senior Policy Operating Group, which meets quarterly and consists of senior officials designated as representatives by PITF members, coordinates interagency policy, grants, research, and planning issues involving international trafficking and the implementation of the TVPA.<br />
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The U.S. government undertook multiple efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex and forced labor. The Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and State completed recommendations to Congress on how to reduce the likelihood that imported agricultural products and commodities are produced with the use of forced labor and child labor. The Departments of State and Defense were part of a multi-stakeholder process that led to 60 private security companies signing on to an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. These companies pledged to uphold a number of principles in their company policies and in the conduct of their personnel, including not engaging in human trafficking, sexual exploitation, or prostitution. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched a code of conduct that prohibits USAID contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and sub-grantees during the period of performance of their contracts or awards from engaging in trafficking in persons, procuring commercial sex acts, or using forced labor. DOL published an updated list of 128 goods from 70 countries that DOL had reason to believe were produced by child labor or forced labor in violation of international standards, and released the ninth annual Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor and a revised list of products produced by forced or indentured child labor. DHS continued to enforce the prohibition against importing such products under the relevant statute, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. New legislation was proposed but not passed to increase enforcement capabilities in this area. DoD continued its demand reduction campaign to help make contractors, government personnel, and military members aware of common signs of human trafficking and hotline numbers to report suspected incidents. Enforcement of the zero-tolerance policy involved two service members who were punished for prostitution offenses, which included withholding promotions, reducing grades, levying fines, and restricting movement to the base.<br />
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State and local jurisdictions also engaged in a number of efforts to reduce demand for commercial sex. Some jurisdictions tested various combinations of arrests, shaming, and education of apprehended purchasers of prostitution. NGOs devoted to ending demand for commercial sex developed school curricula, conducted outreach campaigns, and worked with law enforcement. Reports continued to reflect significant numbers of arrests for commercial sexual activity. Data continued to reflect the arrests of more women than men for such activity; state and local law enforcement arrested 38,593 women versus 16,968 men for prostitution offenses and commercialized vice in 2009, the year for which the most recent data is available.<br />
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Allegations against federal contractors engaged in commercial sex and labor exploitation continued to surface in the media. During the reporting period, allegations were investigated and one employee was dismissed by a DoD contractor. The Inspectors General at the Departments of State and Defense and USAID continued their audits of federal contracts to monitor vulnerability to human trafficking and issued public reports of their findings and reparations. USAID also created an entity dedicated to proactively tracking contractor compliance with the authority to suspend contracts and debar contracting firms, a positive step toward increasing enforcement in this area. No prosecutions occurred and no contracts were terminated.<br />
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The U.S. government continued prevention efforts within its temporary worker and student programs. The A-3 and G-5 visa categories allow persons to enter the United States as domestic workers of foreign diplomatic or consular personnel (“foreign mission personnel”) or foreign employees of international organizations. The Department of State continued its ongoing work to help protect these visa holders, including implementing a system to track the visa application process of A-3 and G-5 visa holders, to require their payment into bank accounts, and to track allegations of abuse. During the reporting period, there were more than a dozen allegations of various forms of abuse and domestic servitude, including civil lawsuits against, and criminal investigations of, foreign mission personnel. The Department of State put procedures in place to closely review and, where appropriate, to deny A-3 and G-5 visas for workers of foreign mission personnel in the United States against whom serious allegations of abuse had been lodged. Under U.S. law, a foreign mission will lose the ability to sponsor additional domestic workers if the Secretary determines that there is credible evidence that a domestic worker was abused and that the mission tolerated the abuse; no suspensions occurred within the reporting period. However, the threat of suspension has been effective in alerting missions to the importance the Department places on the treatment of domestic workers and the need for missions to ensure that domestic workers are treated in accordance with Department guidance. The Department also issued new guidelines on prevailing wages for domestic workers employed by foreign mission personnel, including a prohibition against lodging deductions for live-in workers, and capping the percentage of salary that can be assessed for three meals per day at 20 percent. A-3 and G-5 visa holders who filed civil lawsuits against their former employers were eligible for temporary immigration relief and work authorization.<br />
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DOJ and DHS led several investigations and prosecutions for trafficking of temporary agricultural workers on H-2A visas and temporary hospitality, food service, and construction workers on H-2B visas. Employers who have committed certain violations of the temporary worker programs may be barred from filing future applications for a three-year period; five H-2B employers – the first ever – and three H-2A employers were barred during the reporting period, for a total of eight debarred employers. A DOL regulation came into effect during the reporting period that strengthened protections for agricultural guestworkers by prohibiting foreign recruiters from charging workers certain fees. Reports indicate that recruiters adjusted their practices by charging fees after the workers had obtained their visas and levying charges under the guise of “service fees,” which are permitted under the regulation; indebtedness prior to arrival in the United States is a common mechanism of making victims vulnerable to control and compelled work. Recruiters discouraged former workers from reporting labor violations, claiming that U.S. embassies or consulates would not grant future visas for those who complain – assertions that are false and contrary to U.S. law. Workers also feared seeking assistance because of blacklisting and other retaliation against workers who complain about their conditions. The new regulation addresses these issues by imposing on employers an affirmative obligation against retaliation, the failure of which can result in removal from program participation.<br />
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During the reporting period, the Department of State received a significant increase in the number of complaints regarding the J-1 Summer Work Travel program, which provides foreign students an opportunity to live and work in the United States during their summer vacation from college or university. Complaints were reported from foreign governments, program participants, their families, concerned American citizens, the media, law enforcement agencies, other federal and local agencies, and the Congress. These included reports of fraudulent job offers, inappropriate jobs, job cancellations on arrival, insufficient number of work hours, and housing and transportation problems. To minimize the risk that J-1 Summer Work Travel program participants may become victims of crime, the Department adopted new program-wide regulations and undertook a pilot program requiring verified employment prior to arrival in the United States, prohibiting the use of third party staffing agencies, and enhanced oversight by the Department of State.<br />
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The U.S. government continued measures to inform and educate the public, including potential victims, about the causes and consequences of human trafficking. HHS distributed public multi-lingual awareness materials, including brochures, fact sheets and posters, as part of an extensive nationwide campaign that began in 2004 and funded an NGO to operate a national hotline. In FY 2010, the hotline received a total of 11,381 phone calls, an increase of more than 4,000 from the previous year. The hotline received a broad range of calls, from information requests and wage disputes to exploitation and abuse. Of all legally documented foreign nationals, the national human trafficking hotline received the highest number of calls from J-1, H-2A, H-2B, A-3 and G-5 visa holders. HHS also funded 18 projects to conduct outreach, public awareness, and identification efforts. Embassies and consulates worldwide continued distribution of a “know your rights” pamphlet and oral briefings for approved student or work-based visa applicants – efforts which resulted in 624 calls to the national hotline in FY 2010. DHS launched the “Blue Campaign,” an initiative to coordinate and enhance the Department’s anti-human trafficking activities. International and domestic awareness campaigns included multi-lingual television and radio announcements, billboards, newspaper advertisements, victim assistance materials, and indicator cards for law enforcement. DHS also expanded online resources, including social media, and distributed a virtual toolkit to employers in the lodging, transportation, entertainment, agricultural, manufacturing and construction industries. DOL launched a nationwide campaign to inform low-wage workers in such industries as construction, janitorial work, hotel services, food services and home health care about their rights and how to recover wages owed; the campaign did not include specific anti-trafficking information.<br />
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The United States does not directly participate in UN peacekeeping and has only a minimal presence within those operations. Nevertheless, pre-deployment anti-trafficking training takes place for all military personnel. DoD updated its mandatory general human trafficking awareness training, with the potential to reach 3.5 million military members and civilian employees.<br />
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U.S. laws provide extraterritorial jurisdiction over child sex tourism offenses perpetrated overseas by U.S. citizens. DHS made seven criminal arrests resulting in five indictments and six convictions in child sex tourism cases in FY 2010.<br />
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U.S. Insular Areas<br />
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The U.S. insular areas consist of American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Federal authority over these areas resides in the Department of the Interior (DOI), which participated in the President’s Interagency Task Force in 2010. While the U.S. government has compacts of free association with Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, they are independent of the United States and thus discussed and ranked in separate narratives. The insular areas are a destination for men and women subjected to forced labor, debt bondage, and forced prostitution.<br />
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In the Territory of American Samoa, there were no new reported human trafficking cases. The legislature did not pass a bill, introduced in October 2009, which would have criminalized human trafficking as a felony offense.<br />
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In CNMI, there were six reported human trafficking cases involving multiple victims held in clubs, restaurants and massage parlors. A trend was observed involving the cancellation of victims’ return airplane tickets upon admission, stranding them with no financial means to return and rendering them wholly dependent on their employers. During the reporting period, the Federal Labor Ombudsman identified 71 victims of trafficking or fraud in labor contracting, of whom about 20 percent were sex trafficking victims. In 2010, the NGO working on the local anti-trafficking task force assisted 36 human trafficking victims and 40 fraud in labor contracting victims; an additional 31 victims qualified for services but could not be assisted due to insufficient funds.<br />
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In the Territory of Guam, DOJ prosecuted a multi-victim sex trafficking case, convicting a karaoke bar owner who forced multiple young women from Chu’uk in the Federated States of Micronesia and one juvenile girl into prostitution. The Guam legislature did not address a draft bill that would have closed loopholes that allow massage parlors to conduct illicit activities. There continued to be concern that a military build-up on Guam could involve labor exploitation and trafficking of the thousands of guestworkers expected; efforts were made by federal actors to have this considered in the planning stages. DOJ led a coordinated effort to identify human trafficking cases, provide services to victims, and bring the traffickers to justice in Guam and the CNMI. Uniquely, this effort included participation of foreign consulates from source countries and cross-training with investigators and other government officials from other Pacific jurisdictions.<br />
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In the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico there were no reported trafficking cases. NGOs worked to bring the issue to the attention of the legislature, law enforcement, service providers and the public at large. Puerto Rico had no local anti-trafficking law; there is an outstanding proposal to revise the penal code to include trafficking. There were no local government efforts or coordination with federal authorities to address human trafficking.<br />
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There were no documented cases of human trafficking in the U.S. Virgin Islands.<br />
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In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, ICE officers in the U.S. Virgin Islands were placed on alert for potential human trafficking, but no victims were identified.<br />
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<br />
<br />
SAUDI ARABIA (Tier 3)<br />
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Saudi Arabia is a destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and to a much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Men and women from Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and many other countries voluntarily travel to Saudi Arabia as domestic servants or other low-skilled laborers, but some subsequently face conditions indicative of involuntary servitude, including nonpayment of wages, long working hours without rest, deprivation of food, threats, physical or sexual abuse, and restrictions on movement, such as the withholding of passports or confinement to the workplace. Recent reports of abuse include the driving of nails into a domestic worker’s body. Although many migrant workers sign contracts delineating their rights, some report work conditions that are substantially different from those described in the contract while others never see the contract at all, leaving them vulnerable to forced labor, including debt bondage. Due to Saudi Arabia’s requirement that foreign workers receive permission from their employer to get an “exit visa” before they are able to leave the country, some migrant workers report that they were forced to work for months or years beyond their contract term because their employer would not grant them the exit permit. Local and international media reported in May and June that some Nepalese domestic workers had been recruited to work in Kuwait and then illegally transported to work in Saudi Arabia against their will.<br />
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Women, primarily from Asian and African countries, were believed to have been forced into prostitution in Saudi Arabia; others were reportedly kidnapped and forced into prostitution after running away from abusive employers. Yemeni, Nigerian, Pakistani, Afghan, Chadian, and Sudanese children were subjected to forced labor as beggars and street vendors in Saudi Arabia, facilitated by criminal gangs. Saudi authorities reported fewer Yemeni children may have been forced to work in Saudi Arabia during the reporting period. Some Saudi nationals travel to destinations including Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh to solicit prostitution. Some Saudi men used legally contracted “temporary marriages” in countries such as Egypt, India, Mauritania, Yemen, and Indonesia as a means by which to sexually exploit young girls and women overseas.<br />
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The Government of Saudi Arabia does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so. In a positive development, the government undertook some efforts to improve its response to the vast human trafficking problem in Saudi Arabia, including training government officials on its 2009 anti-trafficking law and conducting surprise visits to places where victims may be found. The government also achieved its first conviction under its human trafficking law. Nonetheless, the government did not prosecute and punish a significant number of trafficking offenders or significantly improve victim protection services during the year. The government’s policy of allowing Saudi citizens and residents to sponsor migrant workers and restrict their freedoms, including exit from the country, continued to obstruct significant progress in dealing with human trafficking. While Saudi Arabia continued to discuss alternatives to its sponsorship law, the government did not implement any new system. Domestic workers – the population most vulnerable to forced labor – remained excluded from general labor law protections, and employers continued to regularly withhold workers’ passports as a means of keeping them in forced labor.<br />
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Recommendations for Saudi Arabia: Significantly increase efforts to prosecute, punish, and stringently sentence traffickers, including abusive employers and those culpable of trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation, under the 2009 anti-trafficking law; enforce laws prohibiting employers from withholding migrants’ passports and arbitrarily denying permission for exit visas as a means of preventing trafficking abuses; reform the structure of the sponsorship system to discourage employers from withholding workers’ passports and restricting workers’ movements; institute a formal victim identification mechanism to distinguish trafficking victims among the thousands of workers deported each year for immigration violations and other crimes; ensure that victims of trafficking are not punished for acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, such as running away from abusive employers; ensure trafficking victims in practice are able to pursue criminal cases against their employers; improve victim protection at the Riyadh shelter by transforming it into an open shelter where victims are not locked in; enforce labor laws and expand full labor protections to domestic workers; and continue and expand judicial training and public awareness campaigns on recognizing cases of human trafficking.<br />
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Prosecution<br />
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The Government of Saudi Arabia made limited law enforcement efforts against human trafficking during the reporting period. The “Suppression of the Trafficking in Persons Act,” promulgated by Royal Decree number M/40 of 2009 defines and prohibits all forms of human trafficking, prescribing punishments of up to 15 years and fines of up to $266,667. Penalties may be increased under certain circumstances, including trafficking committed by an organized criminal group or committed against a woman, child, or person with special needs. These penalties are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes. Since the law includes some concepts unrelated to human trafficking, the government must disaggregate law enforcement activity under this law to indicate which prosecutions and convictions are for trafficking. Although the 2009 anti-trafficking law does not address withholding passports and exit visas as a means of obtaining or maintaining a person’s forced labor or service, Council of Ministers decision 166 of 2000 prohibits the common practice of withholding workers’ passports. The Council of Ministers statement accompanying the 2009 anti-trafficking law secures the right of victims to remain in Saudi Arabia during the investigation and court proceedings, incentivizing their assistance in prosecutions. The government’s Permanent Committee on Trafficking funded and organized regional trainings for 48 judges, lawyers, recruitment officers, social workers, and police officers on the 2009 anti-trafficking law and the definition of trafficking. During the reporting period, the government reported receiving 23 accusations of trafficking, resulting in 13 ongoing investigations and 10 prosecutions. One of these cases resulted in a successful conviction. On January 9, 2011, the Medina Summary Court sentenced a 54-year old Saudi woman accused of abusing and severely injuring her Indonesian maid to three years in prison, but denied the victim any monetary compensation associated with the criminal case. The victim is, however, entitled to monetary compensation in the ongoing civil trial. According to the Permanent Committee on Trafficking, government authorities also arrested individuals in at least nine other trafficking cases. The government neither reported any arrests, prosecutions, convictions, or sentences for forced prostitution, nor did it report efforts to enforce the Council of Ministers decision prohibiting the confiscation of foreign workers’ passports; this practice continued to be widespread. The government also did not report any investigations, arrests, prosecutions, or sentences of government officials for trafficking-related complicity.<br />
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Protection<br />
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Saudi Arabia made limited progress in protecting victims, but its overall efforts remained inadequate during the reporting period. Despite unannounced visits by the Permanent Committee on Trafficking to deportation centers, prisons, shelters, juvenile detention centers, equestrian clubs, and camel races to identify victims, procedures were not implemented to systematically identify victims of trafficking among vulnerable populations and the Committee did not report any victims identified during their visits. As a result, many victims of trafficking are likely punished for acts committed as a result of being trafficked. Under Saudi law, foreign workers may be detained, deported, or in some cases, corporally punished for running away from their employers. Council of Ministers decision 244 authorizes the Permanent Committee on Trafficking to exempt trafficking victims from these punishments, but victims are often detained or deported without being identified. Women arrested for prostitution offenses face prosecution and, if convicted, imprisonment or corporal punishment, even if they are victims of trafficking.<br />
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The 2009 anti-trafficking law affords victims explanation of their legal rights in a language they understand, physical and psychological care, shelter, security, and the ability to stay in Saudi Arabia to testify in court proceedings. However, many victims sought refuge at their embassies instead; source countries report handling thousands of complaints of unpaid wages, physical or sexual abuse, or poor working conditions each year. One victim received medical and legal assistance from the Government of Saudi Arabia for injuries inflicted by her trafficker, including services for reconstructive surgery. It remains unclear, however, whether these rights are afforded in regular practice. No shelter or services are available to victims of sex trafficking. The government operated a short-term shelter for female runaway domestic workers in Riyadh, some of whom were likely subjected to physical or sexual abuse by their employers. In previous years, victims of physical and psychological abuse at these shelters reported that they were unlikely to receive assistance and some reported long waiting periods before the conclusion of their cases. The women were not free to leave and experienced restrictions on communication with family or consular contacts. In smaller cities in Saudi Arabia with poor access to the government shelter, victims of trafficking were kept in jails until their cases were resolved. Updated information on the conditions at these shelters was not available at the end of the reporting period. The government did not operate any long-term shelters or facilities to assist male victims of trafficking.<br />
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Saudi Arabia offered temporary relief from deportation to two victims who identified themselves to authorities. However, victims who have run away from their employers, overstayed their visas, or otherwise violated the legal terms of their visas were frequently jailed without being identified as victims. Some Saudi employers prevented foreign workers from leaving the country by refusing permission for them to get exit visas; this resulted in workers working beyond their contract terms against their will, languishing in detention centers indefinitely, or paying money to their employers or immigration officials to let them leave. Some police officers assisted victims by referring them to the government shelter. Other police officials, however, returned foreigners to their employers, pressured them to drop cases, or persuaded victims to take monetary compensation in lieu of filing criminal charges against their employers. Some employers file false counter-claims against foreign workers for theft, witchcraft, and adultery in retaliation for workers’ claims of abuse; as a result, in many cases, the workers rather than the employers are punished, which discourages workers from reporting abuse. The government provided some legal assistance to victims of trafficking, including the victim whose employer was sentenced under the 2009 anti-trafficking law. Nonetheless, few migrants successfully pursue criminal cases against abusive employers due to lengthy delays in the immigration and justice system.<br />
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Prevention<br />
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The government has made nominal progress in preventing human trafficking during the reporting period, but systemic problems resulting from sponsorship system regulations persisted. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs continued to encourage imams to regularly include anti-trafficking messages in their Friday sermons. To increase workers’ awareness of their rights, the Ministry of Labor continued to produce a guidebook for migrant workers in Arabic, English, and some source country languages. The government failed, however, to significantly reform the sponsorship structure to discourage employers from withholding workers’ passports and restricting workers’ movements. The structure of the sponsorship system, which holds employers responsible for the foreign workers they employ, enables employers to withhold foreign workers’ passports and restrict workers’ movements. Saudi Arabian law enforcement authorities had previously taken an administrative or civil approach in addressing cases of exploitation of workers, such as assessing fines, blacklisting or shutting down employment firms, issuing orders for employers to return withheld passports, or requiring employers to pay back wages. Despite efforts by the Permanent Committee on Trafficking to train law enforcement officials on the criminal punishments that can be levied in worker abuse cases, these punishments are not yet widely applied. In addition, domestic workers remain excluded from general labor law protections. In the reporting period, Saudi Arabia did not take actions to reduce the demand for prostitution or child sex tourism by Saudi nationals or acknowledge that trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation was a problem affecting<br />
the Kingdom.John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-49360187258046186882011-06-07T21:44:00.000-05:002011-06-07T21:44:19.400-05:00Courtland Milloy: For American and Cuban people, divide not that deepBy Courtland Milloy, Tuesday, June 7, 8:37 PM Washington Post<br />
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HAVANA — While the Ballet Nacional de Cuba was in the District recently, I happened to be pirouetting around this town with a group of journalists from the United States. Not exactly a fair cultural exchange, but the Cuban people were gracious hosts nonetheless.<br />
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We got to dine at the homes of community activists and engage in frank talk about Cuba’s social inequities. We also met Johana Tablada, deputy director for North American Affairs in the Cuban Foreign Ministry, who offered tea and a critique of the high life she experienced while staying with friends in well-to-do Chevy Chase.<br />
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“I say, listen, maybe you have the 10 brands of cereal. Maybe you have the 100 options of clothing, which I like,” Tablada said. “But I don’t miss it when I’m here. I will go over at lunchtime and see my mom. Up in Washington, people do not stop; they do not look around. There is always something for you to consume, that consumes your life without you.”<br />
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More remarkable than Tablada’s take was the extent to which her country’s brand of socialism seems to terrify the U.S. government. An ongoing, half-century-long economic embargo aims to bring Cuba to her knees while a spurious designation of the country as a “state sponsor of terrorism” leaves the door open for regime change by force.<br />
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In April, The Washington Post reported that the new chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), told a filmmaker in 2006 that she would welcome the assassination of Cuban leader Fidel Castro.<br />
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And yet, here we were for a week of eyeballing in the forbidden land, the trip sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Advanced Journalism at North Carolina A&T University. Meanwhile, up at the Kennedy Center Opera House in Washington, the Cuban ballet was performing “Don Quixote.”<br />
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What a weird diplomatic dance.<br />
<br />
During a visit to one home on the outskirts of the city, some of us watched a taped documentary that had run on Cuban television in 2008. It was called “Raza,” about the persistence of racism. In it, a white Cuban ballet instructor claimed that the reason blacks don’t make good ballerinas was that their “glutes” were too big and their feet “too inflexible.”<br />
<br />
Now suppose Judith Jamison and the Alvin Ailey Dance Troupe in New York could freely travel and give lie to such a notion — if only for the sake of those Afro Cuban girls who might have heard such discouraging words?<br />
<br />
There are so many ways our countries could help one another. Instead, American arrogance and Cuban pride shortchange us all.<br />
<br />
Heriberto Feraudy of the Cuban Artists and Writers Association told us that he liked the American people but not the U.S. policy towards Cuba. I asked what the difference is. After all, the United States is us.<br />
<br />
“The American people don’t run the country,” Feraudy said through an interpreter. “President Obama doesn’t run the country.”<br />
<br />
Asked who does, he said he didn’t know. All he knew was that polls show more than 70 percent of Americans favored lifting the embargo and restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba — Obama, too. And still the embargo remains.<br />
<br />
The Cato Institute, a Washington-based think tank, says the embargo “has made the Cuban people a bit more impoverished, without making them one bit more free.”<br />
<br />
The Cubans we met were not enslaved commie automatons. Many were intrigued by Cuba’s transitioning from guaranteed government jobs to opportunities for self-employment. Just not at any cost.<br />
<br />
“In the past, people were losing their values over tourism, doing anything for the green paper,” said Abel Contreras, our guide from the state-owned Havanatours. “This is my own opinion. One of the best things this government has done is to give us the possibility of being ourselves, of having self-respect and not being treated like a brothel of the United States.”<br />
<br />
That said, he noted how much the people of both countries have in common.<br />
<br />
“You like baseball; we like baseball,” Contreras said. “We like jazz; you like jazz. You want universal health care and a good education for all; so do we. Both countries are struggling to find solutions to those problems.”<br />
<br />
And don’t forget the food. Contreras likes black beans and rice; I like red beans and rice. Hold the political hot sauce, and our tastes are not so different after all.<br />
<br />
<br />
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/courtland-milloy-for-american-and-cuban-people-divide-not-that-deep/2011/06/07/AG5uVRLH_story.html#weighInJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-76772125729394234972010-08-24T10:48:00.003-05:002010-08-24T10:49:55.205-05:00OFAC Goes After BarclaysBarclays fined $298m for sanction breaking<br />
<br />
Barclays faces penalty from US authorities for handling covert financial transactions involving banks in Cuba, Iran and Libya<br />
<br />
* Andrew Clark<br />
* guardian.co.uk, Monday 16 August 2010 20.27 BST<br />
<br />
<br />
Barclays is to pay $298m (£190m) in fines to the US authorities for "knowingly and willfully" violating international sanctions by handling hundreds of millions of dollars in clandestine transactions with banks in Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Burma.<br />
<br />
The British bank yesterday agreed to pay financial penalties to settle two criminal charges laid by the US department of justice, which accused Barclays of violating a "trading with the enemy" act which prohibits business with certain countries viewed as threats to national security.<br />
<br />
Documents filed at a federal court in Washington accused Barclays of handling money transfers totalling $500m from banks in prohibited countries through its dollar clearance branch in New York between 1995 and 2006. Barclays is not alone in facing such charges: Lloyds TSB and Credit Suisse both settled with the US government last year over similar dealings with institutions in repressive regimes.<br />
<br />
"For more than a decade, Barclays knowingly and willfully engaged in practices outside the US that caused its New York branch and other financial institutions located in the US to process payments in violation of US sanctions," says an affidavit filed by the US government, which described Barclays as a London-based institution employing 144,000 people in 50 countries with 48m customers.<br />
<br />
Under a deferred prosecution agreement signed by Barclays' general counsel, Mark Harding, the bank has agreed to a string of measures to improve training and tighten internal procedures, and to co-operate with any further investigation by the US authorities. The bank is paying $149m to the US department of justice and a further $149m to the office of New York's district attorney.<br />
<br />
The deal went before a Washington judge for approval yesterday. But judge Emmet Sullivan adjourned the hearing, saying he wanted Harding to appear in person: "He's the one who signed the pleadings and he should be here."<br />
<br />
The episode is an embarrassing blot for Barclays, which has been working hard to build its presence in the US with a view to becoming a top-tier Wall Street player. Barclays bolstered its presence in investment banking two years ago by buying much of the US operation of bankrupt Lehman Brothers in a deal worth $1.75bn.<br />
<br />
Court documents reveal that Barclays co-operated proactively with the US authorities, initially approaching the US treasury's office of foreign assets control in May 2006 to own up to four sanctions-busting transactions.<br />
<br />
A Barclays spokesman confirmed that the bank was "in the process of seeking court approval" for a settlement with prosecutors but added: "Because this matter is pending before the court, at this time we will have no further comment."<br />
<br />
The US government has vowed to come down hard on sanctions-busting. Cuba has been barred from business with the US since President Kennedy's tenure in the White House in the early 1960s. Sanctions have been in place against Iran since 1995 and were imposed on Sudan and Burma in 1997. Libya was on a list of "state sponsors of terrorism" until 2006, although relations have since thawed.<br />
<br />
Prosecutors contend that foreign banks with a presence in the US have colluded in giving institutions in these repressive regimes a back-door route into the American financial system. Lloyds TSB agreed to pay $350m in January 2009 for its dealings with Libya, Sudan and Iran, while Switzerland's second biggest bank, Credit Suisse, struck a deal in December paying $536m for violating sanctions against Iran.<br />
<br />
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/aug/16/barclays-fined-for-sanction-breaking<br />
<br />
<br />
Letters<br />
<br />
The blockade against Cuba and the banks<br />
Cuba is not the object of any "international sanctions" (Barclays faces $298m fine for breaking sanctions, 17 August). It has been the target for 50 long years of a unilateral US government policy of economic, commercial and financial blockade – as your article illustrates – but one that the international community has overwhelmingly condemned for 18 consecutive years at the UN general assembly. In the successive resolutions on the issue passed over those years, the UN has called on the US to lift this illegal and inhumane measure, which is found to be in violation of basic principles of international law, the UN charter and the freedom of trade and navigation. This year the UN general assembly will no doubt ratify this position for the 19th time. One can only hope that the US government will listen to that worldwide clamour and abandon such an unhelpful policy in favour of a constructive one.<br />
René J Mujica Cantelar<br />
Ambassador of Cuba to the UK<br />
<br />
<br />
• I never thought I'd rush to the defence of our reviled banks. But news that the US is still enforcing its discredited policy of sanctions on Cuba and that Barclays has been fined by the US justice department for facilitating trade with, among other countries, Cuba appals me. Recently the US has been relaxing the moratorium on Cuba and we have seen a welcome liberalisation there with the release of political prisoners and a lifting of the heavy hand of the state on private enterprise. Therefore I am shocked that Barclays should be penalised in this manner.<br />
<br />
Benedict Birnberg <br />
London <br />
<br />
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/23/blockade-against-cuba-barclays-bankJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-85664095159149395982010-08-16T11:14:00.000-05:002010-08-16T11:14:52.206-05:00Gov. Bill Richardson Washington Post Op EdTime for Western Hemisphere countries to collaborate<br />
<br />
By Bill Richardson<br />
Saturday, August 14, 2010; A13<br />
<br />
Arizona's attempt to create and enforce its own immigration policy has once again amplified -- and politicized -- the immigration debate in this country. But the fallout of that debate extends beyond our borders. The anti-<br />
<br />
immigrant push in Arizona has further alienated our neighbors throughout Latin America, who had been hoping for better relations with the United States after President Obama's election. We need to turn this opportunity to our advantage and engage with our neighbors throughout the Western Hemisphere.<br />
<br />
Latin America has perhaps the greatest impact, in terms of trade and culture, on the daily lives of most Americans. U.S. exports to Latin America have grown faster in the past 11 years than to any other region, including Asia. Hispanics represent the biggest ethnic and most sought-after voting bloc in the United States. And nearly every country in North America, Central America, South America and the Caribbean now has a democratically elected government.<br />
<br />
The time is right to leverage our trade and partnerships and advance a more collaborative relationship with our neighbors to the south. The Obama administration should consider these five steps:<br />
<br />
-- First, it should aggressively lobby Congress for a comprehensive immigration law. Such legislation would include increased border security; a crackdown on illegal hires; and an accountable path to legalization that requires the 11 million immigrants here illegally to learn English, pass a background check, pay fines and get in line behind those who are trying to enter our country legally. Illegal immigrants come to our country from Central and South America and the Caribbean. This is not just an issue with Mexico; it is a hemispheric issue that needs a comprehensive response.<br />
<br />
<b>-- Second, as a first step to changing our policy toward Cuba, the president should issue an executive order to lift as much of the travel ban as possible. The travel ban penalizes U.S. businesses, lowers our credibility in Latin America and fuels anti-U.S. propaganda. Lifting the ban would also be a reciprocal gesture for Cuba's recent agreement, negotiated among the Catholic Church, the Spanish government and President Ra?l Castro, to release political dissidents. Obama has taken significant steps to loosen restrictions on family travel, remove limits for remittance and expand cooperation in other areas such as expanding the export of humanitarian goods from the United States into Cuba. Loosening travel restrictions is in U.S. interests and would be a bold move toward normalization of relations with Cuba.</b><br />
<br />
-- Third, embark on a new Alliance for Progress with Latin America and the Caribbean, modeled on President John F. Kennedy's vision for the hemisphere. This should not be a one-sided alliance preconceived on expansion of U.S. markets, nor an agreement that imposes a U.S. solution. We need a new partnership in which we close the gap between the haves and have-nots by addressing both human and economic needs and giving more priority to the indigenous people of this hemisphere.<br />
<br />
The United States needs to craft a hemispheric agenda that includes and emphasizes solutions to energy demands and climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean. Perhaps we need a hemispheric agreement on renewable energy that provides the technical know-how for the Americas and dramatically expands the biofuel agreement with Brazil. We also need to move quickly toward a real carbon-trading system that would reward countries that protect their forests.<br />
<br />
-- Fourth, we should continue to seek trade agreements that are free and fair and contain strong standards on labor, the environment and human rights. Pending trade agreements with Colombia and Panama should be approved by Congress and once again establish the United States as a reliable trading partner. Additionally, the Obama administration should seek a hemispheric agreement on common labor, environmental and human rights standards. This bold move would promote our interests and image in the region.<br />
<br />
-- Finally, we need a hemispheric accord on crime and violence. In New Mexico, we are working with law enforcement at the local, state and federal levels and on both sides of our border with Mexico to share intelligence and stop the illicit trade of narcotics, illegal guns and human trafficking. These are transnational issues that involve a coordinated effort to protect the safety of law-abiding citizens of the United States and Mexico. We must not allow the immigration debate to distract from our national responsibility to engage with our neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean. Better hemispheric relations should be a foreign policy priority, not an afterthought.<br />
<br />
The writer, a Democrat, is governor of New Mexico. He is former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and former energy secretary. <br />
<br />
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/13/AR2010081304982.html?hpid=opinionsbox1John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-55094912184025756002010-07-27T12:38:00.000-05:002010-07-27T12:38:02.133-05:00OFAC Nails UN Bank For Dealing With Cuban Diplomats to the UNExport Law Blog (blog) - July 19<br />
<br />
By Clif Burns<br />
<br />
The latest monthly release of civil penalty information by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) describes a penalty “settlement’ with the United Nations Federal Credit Union, which agreed to pay $500,000 to settle charges that the UNFCU “dealt in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national had an interest’ as they quaintly say it in OFAC-speak. In ordinary English this means that UNFCU engaged in banking transactions with Cubans, likely with Cuban diplomats to the United Nations.<br />
<br />
Of course, we have to say the transactions were likely with Cuban diplomats because, given OFAC’s longstanding aversion to providing anything but the most minimal details about its penalty settlements, the notice leaves out such crucial details as whether the Cubans involved were diplomats, non-diplomatic Cuban officials, ordinary Cubans, or herds of Cuban cattle. Nor were the types of transactions involved mentioned or their amounts.<br />
<br />
In this case, the absence of details makes OFAC look foolish by suggesting the possibility that OFAC is penalizing the UNFCU for providing banking services to Cuban diplomats posted to the U.N. Apparently, such diplomats need to travel with suitcases of Cuban pesos and pay for their meals in the U.N. cafeteria with their national currency.<br />
<br />
If that’s what OFAC is doing, it would be in direct contravention of the U.N. Headquarters Agreement, particularly given that the UNFCU is located in the U.N. Headquarters area. Article V, Section 15(4) of that agreement provides that even with respect to diplomats from countries not recognized by the United States, such as Cuba, the U.S. must accord them the same privileges and immunities as other diplomats while within the headquarters district. If a diplomat from France can bank at the UNFCU located in the U.N. Headquarters district, so can Cuban diplomats, no matter how much OFAC hates Castro and his diplomatic lackeys.<br />
<br />
The UNFCU website has this statement (click on “Account Restrictions”) about its ability to deal with Cuban diplomats:<br />
<br />
Please be aware that UNFCU, under authorization from the US Treasury Department, is only permitted to operate accounts for actively employed UN staff stationed in Cuba, Iran, Burma, and for Cuban citizens who are stationed in the United States. <br />
<br />
Based on this, perhaps what was going on and again OFAC forces us to speculate was that the UNFCU was providing banking services to Cubans at U.N. locations outside the United States. The UNFCU website’s branch listing shows that the UNFCU has branches in Geneva, Vienna, Rome and Nairobi. Of course, the UNFCU’s extra-territorial application of U.S. sanctions could create a new problem for itself because these sanctions could well violate local laws that prohibit discrimination based on national origin.<br />
<br />
Additionally, and more significantly, the UN could always solve the problem by only providing office space to financial institutions that do not, like UNFCU, discriminate against UN members based on national origin.John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-14631701328708713252010-07-02T07:53:00.000-05:002010-07-02T07:53:44.580-05:00Who is a spy and why?Agents<br />
La Alborada - July 2<br />
<br />
The FBI has charged eleven people with conspiracy to act as agents of a foreign government --Russia-- without notifying the Attorney General. That's not "spying" or "being an unregistered foreign agent," but conspiracy to act as an agent. The Associated Press interpreted the news this way: "Russian agents infiltrated US society, charges say": infiltrated not the government or the Pentagon, but society. Nothing that we have found in the news so far suggests that the accused gathered any information of significance. The indictment charges that the defendants were paid or expected to be paid by Russia for their work.<br />
<br />
The eleven defendants were arrested and jailed. Proceedings in the matter will determine whether or not they are guilty of any of the charges brought. If they are found guilty, they will surely serve time in prison.<br />
<br />
They will never be called "dissidents," the generic name given to a number of people in Cuba who include agents of the US government. Many of them have been jailed since 2003. The evidence against the latter, obtained in part from Cuban security agents who had been posing as collaborators and also, as was the case here, by surveillance, was summarized in a book, Los Disidentes, published soon afterwards in Cuba. <br />
<br />
The evidence showed that the dissidents were coordinated, directed, and financed by the US Interests Section in Havana, and also from Madrid. The declared independent journalists turned out to be independent from the Cuban government, but not from the US. They were told what kind of information they should generate; on their compliance depended the support, including payment in money and kind, that they received from the Interests Section, at which they often met to coordinate their activities.<br />
<br />
The financing of dissidents --or subversives, depending on point of view-- in Cuba by the US is no secret. Congress periodically appropriates money in the millions of dollars officially earmarked to support the dissidents. When it is the US that does this, it considers it proper and necessary, a matter of course. It sees no need to make such payments a covert operation; in fact, it announces the payments proudly. The US also helps to arrange favorable media coverage for the dissidents. <br />
<br />
The mass media never, ever, mention the evidence of control of and payment to the dissidents arrested in 2003. It, too, considers it normal that the US should sponsor them, or pretends that there is no connection, although charges of such an arrangement have become a major factor in reporting on the alleged Russian agents. <br />
<br />
Russia is not attempting to overthrow the US government, nor could it do so; certainly not by using the kind of information that is at issue in the current case. The US no doubt has its own agents and spies in Russia, but it is not seeking to overthrow the Russian government. The US, however, is committed by law to overthrow the Cuban government, which is the ultimate goal of the blockade. Alan Gross was in Cuba surreptitiously under a grant dedicated to such a purpose. In 2003, in fact, the Bush administration served notice to states that it did not like that they could experience the same shock and awe to which Iraq was subjected. <br />
<br />
SInce 1959, the US has sponsored and/or sheltered a variety of terrorists, such as Luis Posada Carriles, whose goal is to overthrow the government of Cuba by force. It was because of this that Cuba sent agents to Florida to gather information on what these elements were planning. That information did not remain secret, however; Cuba turned it over to the FBI. As a result, the FBI arrested the Cuban Five, who are now serving up to two consecutive life sentences. <br />
<br />
Whatever one thinks of the Cuban government, it should not be hard to see why the Cubans would be upset at the financing and directing of US agents on the island, to the point of imprisoning them, especially considering US policy and the circumstances of 2003. <br />
<br />
What justifies the difference in approach to the case of those charged as Russian agents and the case of the US agents in Cuba? Essentially, it comes down to two things: 1) Because we are Good and they are Bad; and 2) Because we can do it.<br />
<br />
The policy --and law-- as to Cuba remains in effect. There is nothing to suggest that, if the Cubans did not react to the funding and direction of dissidents on the island, the US would cease to sponsor agents there. On the contrary, there would likely be more such agents in Cuba. <br />
<br />
The US has Cuban agents in jail, and Cuba has US agents in jail. If there is the will to improve relations between the two governments, one place to start would be to exchange them.<br />
<br />
<br />
LA ALBORADA<br />
Washington, DC<br />
nuevas@earthlink.net<br />
Cuban American Alliance Education Fund<br />
www.cubamer.orgJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-70850303323009178042010-05-27T22:15:00.002-05:002010-05-27T22:15:35.925-05:00American Businesses Hoping to Cash In On CubaCNBC.com<br />
| 26 May 2010 | 01:03 PM ET<br />
<br />
American industries of all kinds—from travel and telecom to construction and energy—would be poised to profit if the 52-year trade embargo with Cuba were lifted. Among the first businesses to cash in would be those involved with tourism, most experts agree.<br />
<br />
“I believe U.S. travel and tourism companies will be the first to benefit,” said Larry Register, president of the Cuba Business Bureau consulting firm.<br />
<br />
“The travel sector already is getting prepared for what might happen,” said Kirby Jones, president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association.<br />
<br />
In fact, the U.S. travel industry already has seen a significant growth in Cuban tourism, even with the embargo still in place.<br />
<br />
President Obama, who has called for “a new era” in relations with the island country, lifted nearly all restrictions on Cuban Americans' travel there in April, 2009. This year, more than 20,000 Cuban-Americans travel to their homeland each month, compared to 9,000 before the restrictions were lifted. The Bush Administration had allowed only one visit per person every three years.<br />
<br />
Last week, the U.S. agency that enforces Cuba sanctions approved 42 new travel and other service providers, allowing them to do business with Cuba. There were no such approvals last year.<br />
<br />
If travel restrictions to Cuba were lifted for all Americans, first-year projections suggest that 800,000 to 1 million Americans would visit, said Jones, whose Alamar Associates consulting firm staged a U.S.-Cuba tourism summit in Cancun earlier this year.<br />
<br />
“There were 120 people there,” Jones said. “All major travel-sector tour operators came to meet with Cuban officials to discuss the potential of doing business and how it might be done.”<br />
<br />
Cuba began developing its tourism industry after the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union, which had granted Cuba billions of dollars in annual subsidies. Last year, more than 2.5 million tourists visited Cuba, mostly from Europe and Canada. Tourism is now Cuba’s biggest source of foreign income.<br />
<br />
Jones, who has advised U.S. companies on Cuba since 1974, is not optimistic about an outright end to the Cuban trade embargo. But he thinks a piece of legislation moving through Congress may serve much the same purpose.<br />
<br />
House Agriculture Committee Chairman Collin Peterson, D-Minn., is sponsor of a bill that would eliminate some of the cumbersome restrictions faced by farmers who have been selling food to Cuba since 2001.<br />
<br />
The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 lifted part of the trade embargo, allowing the sale of food and medical supplies to Cuba’s 11 million people. Since then, a steady flow of U.S. corn, cattle, wheat, rice, apples, cereal and soybeans has made its way to Cuba, which must import 70 percent of its food.<br />
<br />
But the reform bill mandated that Cuba had to pay cash upfront for all transactions—allowing no credit. It further stipulated that both parties to any transaction had to use a bank in a third country, disallowing any direct dealings between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions.<br />
<br />
Even with those restrictions, U.S. exports to Cuba reached $710 million in 2008, before the global recession forced the cash-poor island to cut back 26 percent last year to $528 million.<br />
<br />
Peterson’s bill would do two things. First, it would allow direct transactions between U.S. and Cuban banks. Farmers have long been complaining that the forced use of another foreign bank adds needless cost and prevents expansion of their business.<br />
<br />
The second part of the bill is more controversial. It would lift the travel ban for all U.S. citizens, so the resulting increase in tourism would help Cubans generate the cash they need to buy more U.S. goods.<br />
<br />
“They’re within 10 votes of getting this passed in the House,” Jones said. “I’ve been following this issue for 35 years and I’ve never seen anything like this. They’re not quite there yet, but it’s closer than it’s ever been.”<br />
<br />
A lifting of travel restrictions would sound the death knell for the embargo, Jones believes.<br />
<br />
“Right now, most U.S. companies cannot buy or sell goods with Cuba,” he said. “But the validity of having a trade embargo when a million Americans are going there every year loses all sense of logic. I can imagine the head of John Deere thinking to himself,. ‘I can’t sell tractors down there, but my son can go for spring break?’ The embargo would begin to be dismantled.”<br />
<br />
Jones envisions an American tourism influx that would lead to ATMs, U.S. cellphone coverage, and airplane maintenance facilities.<br />
<br />
“There are any number of areas that will be opened up if there is free and open travel to Cuba,” he said.<br />
<br />
Travel and tourism may top the list of business sectors that would benefit from a lifting of the Cuban trade embargo, but they’re followed closely by mining, oil, telecommunications, construction supplies—and virtually everything else.<br />
<br />
“Who wouldn’t want to do business in Cuba? They need everything.” said George Harper, an attorney whose Miami firm often deals with Cuban trade ssues.<br />
<br />
“You name it—construction, road building, services of all kinds, banking insurance,” added Harper, who was born and raised in Cuba. “It’s an absolute gold mine for any company that wants to expand.”<br />
<br />
Beyond travel, the two biggest sectors with potenital for doing business in Cuba are mining and energy, experts say.<br />
<br />
Cuba’s nickel deposits are the third-largest in the world and represent its second most valuable export behind sugar. There are no nickel deposits in the United States, which imports imports all of its nickel, mostly from Canada and Australia. It’s is used widely as an alloy, much of it in the production of stainless steel products.<br />
<br />
Copper, chromium, and cobalt also are mined in Cuba, with lesser quantities of salt, lead, zinc, gold, silver. Immense iron reserves have not yet translated into much production.<br />
<br />
In 2004, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that drilling off the coast of Cuba could yield 5 billion barrels of oil or more. The Brookings Institute has said that Cuban oil reserves are "equal to major fields in Alaska people want to drill."<br />
<br />
Senators Lisa Murkowski, (R)-Alaska, and Mary Landrieu, (D)-La., drafted legislation last year that would lift the trade embargo enough for U.S. oil executives to do business in Cuba, but the bill has languished. In the meantime, a multitude of other countries have moved in.<br />
<br />
“Cuba has entered into quite a few partnerships to aggressively explore their coast,” said Jones, of the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. “Canada, the UK, Spain, Norway, Brazil, Russia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Venezuela – all are partnering with Cuba to get at its oil.”<br />
<br />
The United States still has a huge advantage over other countries because of its proximity to Cuba, even if it’s late to the game. Transportation costs over 90 miles of water would be miniscule when compared to Asia or Russia.<br />
<br />
"We feel that a greater reliance on American technology to develop their resources could have a positive influence on the Cuban culture," said Robert Dillon, spokesman for Murkowski. "American companies are the best equipped and experienced to deal with offshore drilling like this, and we feel that American oil workers are missing out."<br />
<br />
U.S. infrastructure companies stand to gain if the trade embargo is ended or loosened, said Register of the Cuba Business Bureau. “There is need for building supplies, highway development and building renovations.”<br />
<br />
Another area worth exploring “right now” involves U.S. telecommunication firms,” Register added.<br />
<br />
When it eased travel restrictions, The White House also announced it would exempt U.S. telecommunications companies from the trade embargo. Companies like Verizon , Sprint and AT&T could bring better phone and internet service to the island to “promote the freer flow of information,” a White House statement said.<br />
<br />
But the Cuban government rejected such an arrangement. An executive of the government-owned telecommunications company, ETECSA, said two obstacles would first need to be removed. The U.S. froze $160 million in ETECSA funds in 1996, and they want it back. And the agreement that forces Cuba to pay U.S. companies through third countries—the same obstacle the Peterson bill would address—would need to be rescinded.<br />
<br />
“It may seem like the Obama administration has expanded communication possibilities,” said ETECSA exec Vivian Iglesias. “But we know that unless restrictions like the (Cuban Democracy Act) and others that have been tightened since 1992 don’t change, there can’t be any normal communication.”<br />
<br />
“The causes that led to the theft of our funds are still in place,” she said. “If those restrictions don’t change, that prevents direct communication between the United States and Cuba.”<br />
<br />
In October 2009, a small Miami company, TeleCuba Communications Inc., announced it had obtained U.S. permission to lay fiber-optic cable to the island, but the Miami company admitted it has not yet received permission from Cuba.<br />
<br />
While U.S. efforts are stalled, an Italian joint venture that began 12 years ago has developed a widespread cellphone system. Italy now owns 27 percent of ETECSA. Venezuela is spending $63 million to build an undersea fiber-optic cable across the Caribbean that is expected to be completed next year.<br />
<br />
Business opportunities may abound in Cuba, but many impediments remain before U.S. firms can take advantage.<br />
<br />
“I don’t think the embargo will be lifted in my lifetime,” said Cuban-born Harper, the Miami attorney. “But I’m 67. Maybe in my children’s lifetimes.<br />
<br />
“I think the Castro boys will find a way to keep it in place,” he continued. “The embargo has been a good friend of theirs. There are few other things they can rally the Cuban people behind. It would be very difficult to keep control over people if there’s a free flow of information.”<br />
<br />
<br />
http://www.cnbc.com/id/37339627/John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-81269715327340011312010-05-27T21:45:00.002-05:002010-05-27T21:45:29.871-05:00Oil for U.S. and Cuba's troubled watersBy Ken Stier, contributor<br />
<br />
May 26, 2010: 10:45 AM ET<br />
<br />
<br />
(Fortune) -- Among the many good reasons to jettison our failed economic embargo against Cuba is one with timely new resonance: oil.<br />
<br />
Cuba has plenty of it -- offshore in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) -- and exploration is about to being in earnest with American companies stuck on the sidelines.<br />
<br />
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates the nation has about 4.6 billion barrels and nearly 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the North Cuba Basin, and possibly four times that much in its portion of the Gulf of Mexico. The lower estimate would put Cuba on a par with Ecuador or Colombia.<br />
<br />
But monetizing these resources is a real challenge: The 48-year old U.S. embargo and Washington's diplomatic muscle have thwarted any real progress so far. But this edifice is under siege. The Spanish, through their energy giant, Repsol, are bringing a deep-water oil drilling rig to Cuba this fall.<br />
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Trade sanctions dictate that the rigs can not contain more than 10% of U.S.-made components, which can include software. Most rigs worldwide typically top that. To get around the restrictions, Repsol contracted for a Chinese, purpose-built rig from Saipem, the offshore drilling unit of Italy's Eni, SpA, which will operate the rig. When Repsol first drilled off Cuba's shore in 2004, its core samples were promising enough to bring on partners for this go-round, including Norway's Statoil and India's national oil company. Repsol did not reply to repeated requests for comment.<br />
<br />
After Repsol starts drilling, other international oil companies with concession acreage off Cuba are expected to hire the Saipem rig, explains Jorge Pinon, a Cuban energy expert, with 32 years industry experience, including a stint as president of Amoco Oil Latin America before retiring in 2003 from BP, which had taken over Amoco.<br />
<br />
"That rig is going to hang around in Cuban waters for quite a while," says Pinon, now a Florida International University fellow. "And if any of these drilling jobs hit pay dirt and substantial reservoirs are found, then the pressure in Washington is going to be such that you will see the embargo, as far as the oil industry is concerned, falling apart."<br />
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Fears of another spill<br />
<br />
More worrisome to some is a petroleum stampede in Cuba with American companies -- and their environmental standards -- on the sidelines<br />
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"The sobering fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of miles of American coastline and do profound harm to important marine habitats demands cooperative and proactive planning by Washington and Havana to minimize or avoid such a calamity," argues a recent Brookings Institution briefing paper.<br />
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Cuba's EEZ stretches to less than 50 miles from Key West but the embargo prohibits the U.S. from offering any assistance at all; by contrast there are agreements in place with Canada and Mexico to facilitate U.S. aid.<br />
<br />
Both Statoil and Saipem have extensive deepwater experience, but other operators in the 59 Cuban concession areas -- held by the Chinese, Vietnamese, Malaysians, Venezuelans, among others -- don't or have less stellar environmental records.<br />
<br />
Fears of a spill like that at the BP-contracted Deepwater Horizon rig might be an argument for the U.S. to try to head off Cuban exploration, but that seems an increasingly untenable tack, especially because Havana has been offering U.S. companies part of the action for years.<br />
0:00 /2:42Cheap oil: Careful what you wish for<br />
<br />
A history of failed efforts<br />
<br />
Politics have derailed earlier overtures: During a 2006 summit in Mexico between Cuban officials and U.S. oil executives, the U.S. Treasury insisted the Cubans be booted from the U.S.-owned hotel where they were staying. But industry is again quietly lobbying, and Washington seems to be listening. After trying for a year to get a license to visit Cuba, the Houston-based International Association of Drilling Contractors was recently granted one to go to Havana, which was first reported by Cuba Standard, the leading independent site for business news on Cuba.<br />
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"It's inevitable that Cuba will explore and exploit their offshore hydrocarbon resources, and it would benefit both the American public and the Cuban people to make sure it is done right," argued a recent IADC position paper circulating in Washington.<br />
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Even more potent is the lobbying heft of the Petroleum Equipment Suppliers Associations, whose members include Halliburton (HAL, Fortune 500), Fluor (FLR, Fortune 500) and Bechtel. Industry sources credit PESA for a provision in a pending energy bill that would permit extensive industry contacts with Cuba.<br />
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A member company executive confirmed the industry sees "great opportunity" in Cuba while expressing concern that the time it takes to work out suitable conditions -- tax protocols, IP and contract sanctity protection -- could leave American companies trailing their international rivals.<br />
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Lifting or relaxing the embargo is just one step the Obama administration needs to take toward opening two-way trade with Cuba. The only real exception to the embargo -- for U.S. agricultural sales approved after 2001's devastating Hurricane Michelle -- is stymied because credit-starved Cuba has to pay cash up front. Removing that restriction could double sales to roughly $1.5 billion a year.<br />
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That is part of the "tremendous authority" the president has to advance bilateral relations, argues Jake Colvin, vice president for global trade issues at the National Foreign Trade Council, which opposes the embargo.<br />
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The Council recently joined eight other leading business organizations to support the pending Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act, to better position American businesses for the eventual lifting of the embargo. Seeing Exxon Mobil (XOM, Fortune 500) invest in Cuba probably requires "fundamental change" in bilateral relations, Colvin adds.<br />
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Not everyone wants the embargo to go<br />
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That the White House, and a Democratic Congress, haven't done more to jump-start that process has frustrated some supporters who note the sway that Cuban exiles have with Washington.<br />
<br />
Albert Fox, Jr., founder of the Alliance for Responsible Cuba Policy, points to an April 15 fund-raiser in Miami that reportedly netted $2.5 million for President Obama. The event was hosted by the singer Gloria Estefan, whose father served as a bodyguard to Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, who was overthrown by Castro in 1959.<br />
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"This perception that things are loosening is just nonsense. The embargo is tighter today than it has been at any time in the last 51 years," argues Fox.<br />
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But even though calls for lifting the embargo grow louder as Cuba's current leadership appears ready to change, many warn the U.S. not to jump the gun.<br />
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"American companies need to take in to account business interests are not necessarily the national interest all the time," said Frank Calzon, executive director of the Center for a Free Cuba, and independent organization promoting a democratic transition in the island-nation. "The Cuban regime is coming to an end, there is no question that they are on their last phase now and I think this is the worst possible time for anyone to try to invest."<br />
<br />
--Contact Ken Stier at kenfortune@earthlink.net.<br />
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http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/25/news/economy/oil_cuba.fortune/John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-91446634300012414142010-05-12T11:53:00.002-05:002010-05-12T11:53:16.766-05:00Optimism About Travel Legislation11 May 2010 8:30 AM<br />
By Patrick Mayock<br />
Associate News Editor<br />
patrick@hotelnewsnow.com<br />
<br />
http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/articles.aspx?ArticleId=3300&PageType=News&ArticleType=35<br />
<br />
SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico—When President Obama lifted long-standing restrictions on Cuban-Americans visiting their native island in April 2009 after nearly two decades, it seemed only a matter of time before the United States further eased its embargo on the Caribbean nation, potentially opening a flood of travel and investment while altering the landscape of the region’s tourism industry. <br />
<br />
That time could be less than a year away, if pending legislation makes its way through Congress as is projected, panelists said during a general session at the 14th annual Caribbean Hotel & Tourism Investment Conference last week. <br />
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The Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (H.R. 4645), which prohibits the U.S. president from regulating travel to and from Cuba and liberalizes agricultural trade with the communist nation, could be brought to a vote in the House of Representatives as early as July, according to Timothy Ashby, a corporate attorney with Miami-based Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal. <br />
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The legislation already has enough votes to pass, Ashby said, though Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi has asked bill co-sponsor Rep. Collin Peterson (D-Minnesota) to ensure 220 votes (the bill only needs 217 votes to pass) before she brings it to a vote. <br />
<br />
If the bill passes the House, it will be attached to an appropriations bill in the Senate, which likely would be voted on between the midterm elections and the Christmas holiday recess, Ashby said. Then it would go to President Obama, who already has said he would sign it into law. The law would open travel to Cuba for all U.S. citizens beginning in 2011. <br />
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Impact on Caribbean<br />
<br />
Lifting travel restrictions on Cuba would provide an immediate boon for the country’s travel industry, Ashby said. <br />
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U.S. travel restrictions to Cuba could be lifted by as early as next year, said Timothy Ashby of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal. <br />
<br />
Within the first year travel restrictions are lifted, the U.S. International Trade Commission predicts Cuba will receive between 554,000 and 1 million travelers from the U.S. The Cuban Ministry of Tourism agreed with those projections, adding the country could expect 3 million U.S. tourists within the first five years. <br />
<br />
The Economist Intelligence Unit projects a 15-percent to 20-percent increase in international arrivals and a 10-percent increase per year in foreign exchange earnings, said Emily Morris, the Unit’s Cuba country analyst. <br />
<br />
“By year 2014, you have Cuba just narrowly overtaking the Dominican Republic as the first tourist destination in the Caribbean,” she said.<br />
<br />
Cuba is already preparing for this influx of visitors. The country is looking to expand its existing supply of 50,000 hotel rooms by at least 20,000 rooms during the next five years, according to Carlos Vogeler, regional representative for the Americas for the United Nations World Tourism Organization.<br />
<br />
Even without expansion, the country's tourism industry is showing growth. Cuba received 2.4 million tourists during 2009, 40 percent of whom came from Canada, That represents a 3.4-percent increase from 2008 to 2009. (The world’s international tourism market declined 4.3 percent last year.) <br />
<br />
The country received US$2.3 million in tourism-related receipts during 2009. <br />
<br />
Any short-term benefits that befall Cuba would not adversely affect the rest of the Caribbean travel industry, the panelists agreed. On the contrary, lifting travel restrictions would instead strengthen the region’s appeal throughout the world.<br />
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“If such a thing would happen, it’s not something to fear in the Caribbean. It’s something to welcome,” Vogeler said. “That will definitely impact positively … the whole market.”<br />
<br />
“Development of Cuban tourism actually creates a bridge for an increase in the total volume of tourists to the Caribbean,” Morris said, adding the island would create a natural route via air or sea for travelers and businesspeople. <br />
<br />
Morris did acknowledge a short-term negative impact on the Dominican Republic, Cuba’s closest competitor. But after a slight setback during 2011, the country would eventually approach 5 million international tourist arrivals by 2014. <br />
<br />
Investment<br />
<br />
A lift of travel restrictions also could usher in a swell of U.S. investment in Cuba. <br />
<br />
“The Cubans are also open to U.S. investment,” Ashby said. “ … They would welcome U.S. investors as they would welcome tourists.”John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-87826685992949148752010-05-07T15:41:00.003-05:002010-05-07T16:42:59.296-05:00The Rubio File<meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type"></meta><meta content="Word.Document" name="ProgId"></meta><meta content="Microsoft Word 11" name="Generator"></meta><meta content="Microsoft Word 11" name="Originator"></meta><link href="file:///C:%5CDOCUME%7E1%5CJOHNMC%7E1%5CLOCALS%7E1%5CTemp%5Cmsohtml1%5C01%5Cclip_filelist.xml" rel="File-List"></link><o:smarttagtype name="State" namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"></o:smarttagtype><o:smarttagtype name="country-region" namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"></o:smarttagtype><o:smarttagtype name="City" namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"></o:smarttagtype><o:smarttagtype name="place" namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"></o:smarttagtype><style>
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<div class="MsoNormal"><b>Human Event Interviews Rubio</b></div><div class="MsoNormal"></div><meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type"></meta><meta content="Word.Document" name="ProgId"></meta><meta content="Microsoft Word 11" name="Generator"></meta><meta content="Microsoft Word 11" name="Originator"></meta><link href="file:///C:%5CDOCUME%7E1%5CJOHNMC%7E1%5CLOCALS%7E1%5CTemp%5Cmsohtml1%5C01%5Cclip_filelist.xml" rel="File-List"></link><o:smarttagtype name="country-region" namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"></o:smarttagtype><o:smarttagtype name="place" namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"></o:smarttagtype><style>
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<div class="MsoNormal">HE: When we spoke a year ago, we discussed <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>. When would you approve of lifting the economic embargo against <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>?</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Rubio: When <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> joins the rest of the civilized world in how it treats its people. That is freeing political prisoners, it means free and fair elections They can choose any form of government they like, but they have to have freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of expression. The fundamental rights that we believe are endowed to every human being by our Creator. That’s the kind of country that I’m interested in us having a relationship with. And the embargo serves as leverage for us to be able to accomplish that. You have, as we speak right now, a number of dissidents and hunger strikes in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>. And their brave wives are marching every Sunday. And they’re being beaten, taunted, hassled and harassed. These are women. They’re called the women in white. They’re providing an extraordinary example of just how repressive this regime is and how it’s on the wrong side of history. </div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">HE: So I take it you mean the recognition of the end of the embargo has to come with the end of the Castro brothers?</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Rubio: Not only the end of the Castro brothers, but also political reform in the return of political freedom to the people of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place>. The embargo gives us leverage to negotiate that. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> trades with every other country in the world. The fact of the matter is that the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> embargo is not the reason their economy is failing. Their economy is failing because they’ve embraced a combination of socialism and incompetence, which may be an oxymoron because they’re both the same thing. The point being that I would love for the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> to have a close economic relationship with a free <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>. I think we’re going to see that very soon, God willing.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">HE: Now assuming that free and fair elections were held in this new environment that you described, would you support resuming diplomatic relations before the settlement of Cuban properties.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Rubio: Before the settlement of Cuban properties in terms of their previous owners? I think that’s something for the Cuban people to determine through their new political system that’s in place. They have the right to that determination and to choose any form of government they please. What I’m interested in is having the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> having strong diplomatic and economic ties to a free and fair <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place>. A lot of times past, the issue of property rights there was going to have to be confronted like it was confronted in <st1:place w:st="on">Eastern Europe</st1:place>. But I wouldn’t impose an external mandate. I think the links between Cuban exiles and their families in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place> are close enough that they will be able to establish some sort of an orderly process for property rights to be respected, either returned to their rightful owners or paid for their loss. </div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">HE: That leads to another question about the Obama Administration’s reverting back to the Clinton-era policy of travel and remittances by Cuban Americans to their families living on the island. Does this help the cause of freedom?</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Rubio: It’s hard to tell people they can’t visit their dying grandmother or dying mom. And I get that and it’s sad. By the way, the Bush-era policies allowed people to travel once every three years. Unfortunately, that’s not what’s happening. What’s happening now is that the Castro government is using travel and exile travel as a way to fund its repressive regime. I also think it threatens the immigration status of Cubans. Cubans come to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region></st1:place> on the basis of the Cuban Adjustment Act, which says that Cubans are exiles. Cubans are here because they have no political freedoms. But it’s hard to argue you’re in exile when a year and a month after you arrive, you’re returning repeatedly to the country you’re exiled from. How do you argue that you’re an exile when exile is supposed to be people that can’t return for political purposes? And after 13 months in the country, you’re traveling back? It threatens the exile status of the Cuban community. And it also provides a source of hard currency for the Castro regime. They use the dollars from remittances and from travel to fund their repressive operation<b>. I think it was wrong to lift those travel restrictions. <o:p></o:p></b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><b>http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=36858</b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><b></b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><b></b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><b></b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><b></b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><b><o:p></o:p></b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">******************** </div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Monday, March 15, 2010</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><b>Why Are <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Florida</st1:place></st1:state> Cubans Lukewarm On Rubio?</b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">By David Gauvey Herbert</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Marco Rubio was born in <st1:city w:st="on">Miami</st1:city> to Cuban-born parents, became the first Cuban-American speaker of the Florida House, and he takes a hard line on <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> policy towards <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Havana</st1:city></st1:place>. Rubio leads Gov. Charlie Crist by approximately 28 percentage points in the race for the GOP Senate nomination, and in a matchup with Rep. Kendrick Meek, the presumptive Democratic nominee, he wins by 5 points.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">So with Marco Rubio poised to become the nation's third Cuban-American senator, why haven't the rainmakers in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:state w:st="on">Florida</st1:state></st1:place>'s Cuban-American donor community rallied to his side?</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">His challenges begin with the US-Cuba Democracy PAC. The Florida-based lobbying group is prolific, contributing more than $760,000 to congressional candidates in 2008. In this cycle, it had donated $225,000 to 111 House and Senate candidates across the political spectrum as of Feb. 21, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Rubio is not one of them.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><b>Instead, the PAC has thrown in its lot with Meek, already having given him $7,500 -- more than any other Senate candidate and as much as it gave Reps. Eliot Engel, D-N.Y., and Albio Sires, D-N.J., the top House recipients.</b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Mauricio Claver-Carone, the director for US-Cuba Democracy PAC's <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:state w:st="on">Washington</st1:state></st1:place> operations, stressed that the committee has nothing against Rubio. At a December panel discussion hosted by the committee, Rubio, Crist and Meek all toed the same anti-Castro line, he noted. So then why Meek?</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">"He's the only one who's been in Congress and has a long track record of being an outspoken advocate for human rights and a strong <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place> policy," Claver-Carone said. "Charlie and Marco are great, and they would be great members of Congress, but they haven't had that yet. They've talked about it and they've advocated, but never from a legislative perspective."</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Claver-Carone added that the PAC follows an "incumbency rule" in its giving and considers Meek an incumbent of sorts since he is currently in the House. But the PAC gave $7,000 to former Sen. Mel Martinez, R-Fla., in his 2004 campaign to become the first Cuban-American senator, even though <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Martinez</st1:city></st1:place> had never served in Congress.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><b>The 25 Cuban-Americans who make up US-Cuba Democracy PAC's board, which includes some of the biggest rainmakers in <st1:place w:st="on">South Florida</st1:place>, haven't rallied behind Rubio either. As of the end of the fourth quarter 2009, its board members had donated $31,200 to Crist, $14,950 to Meek, and $73,800 to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, but just $8,150 to Rubio.</b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">The donation numbers for the first quarter of 2010 are not yet available, and several members of the board did not return phone calls about their donations.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Rubio, despite his dominance in the polls, trails both Crist and Meek in cash on hand. Rubio had around $2 million in his coffers at the end of 2009, while Meek had $3.37 million and Crist had $7.56 million.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Does Rubio have a Cuban-American problem? No recent polls have broken down Cuban-American support for Rubio and Crist. But a Public Policy Polling survey released March 10 shows Crist faring better than Rubio with Hispanics in a general election matchup. Crist wins Hispanic voters -- Cuban-Americans account for close to half of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:state w:st="on">Florida</st1:state></st1:place>'s Hispanic vote -- by a 43-22 margin over Meek in a potential matchup. Rubio, meanwhile, trails Meek by a 48-35 gap among Hispanics. Both Republicans would defeat Meek, according to the poll, but Crist enjoys a wider margin of victory, thanks in part to this differential.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><b>Crist has a history of electoral success with this group: He won 70 percent of Cuban-American voters in his 2006 race for the governor's mansion.</b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Alex Burgos, a spokesman for Rubio's campaign, said he is confident his candidate has Cuban-American support.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">"Marco is a product of this community," he said. "He is the proud son of Cuban exiles."</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Still, while Rubio would love to carry the Cuban vote, Little Havana isn't his base. His most strident supporters have largely been white conservatives -- including Tea Partiers nationally. They are the ones who shook the rafters at his CPAC speech last month and continue to pour money into his coffers with one-day online fundraising drives, or "money bombs." Moderate Floridians still favor Crist, but among self-described conservative voters, Rubio trounces the governor by a 69-12 margin in the PPP poll.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Rubio, meanwhile, has taken stances at odds with the Latino community. He is against any immigration reform bill that provides a path to citizenship for the nation's 12 million illegal aliens; a spokesman said Rubio believes the 1986 amnesty was "a mistake." He also opposes counting undocumented immigrants in the Census for the purposes of federal aid and congressional reapportionment.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">That stance drew a stern rebuke from Arturo Vargas, executive director of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials. The organization honored Rubio in 2007 when he became the first Cuban-American leader of the Florida House, but "that was a very different Marco Rubio," Vargas told the Miami Herald last week.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">"I know that in visiting <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Florida</st1:place></st1:state> there has been some significant disappointment in the positions he's taken," Vargas told NationalJournal.com.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Cuban-Americans who want <st1:state w:st="on">Washington</st1:state> to take a hard line with <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Havana</st1:city></st1:place> need allies in Congress more than ever. One of Congress' most outspoken advocates for the Cuban embargo, Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, R-Fla., announced last month that he will not run for re-election. Former Sen. Martinez, another strong anti-Castro voice, resigned in September before the end of his term.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">The Obama administration, meanwhile, has tried to offer <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Havana</st1:city></st1:place> an olive branch by loosening travel restrictions for Cuban-Americans. The US-Cuba Democracy PAC and other hardliners want <st1:city w:st="on">Havana</st1:city> to release political prisoners and legalize opposition political parties before <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Washington</st1:place></st1:state> offers any carrots.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><b>It's worth noting that Crist has had problems in <st1:place w:st="on">South Florida</st1:place>, too. Diaz-Balart and his brother, Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R), who are two of Congress' most anti-Castro members, pulled their endorsement of Crist in December. At the time, Lincoln Diaz-Balart remarked cryptically, "We take our endorsements seriously, but the governor knows why we withdrew and he left us with no alternative."</b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal">Posted on Wed, Dec. 30, 2009 </div><div class="MsoNormal">Crist off his game</div><div class="MsoNormal">BY MICHAEL PUTNEY</div><div class="MsoNormal">mputney@justnews.com</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Charlie Crist is off his game. Way off his game, which was spectacular when it was good. He had the easy rhythm of public life down perfectly. Deferential to the Legislature (even when it didn't deserve it), easily accessible to the media (on a first-name basis with most) and wildly popular with most Floridians, Democrats as well as Republicans. Nowadays, Democrats have pretty much abandoned him, and hard-core GOP conservatives are flocking to Marco Rubio. Charlie's not only lost his mo, he's lost his mojo.</div><div class="MsoNormal">That was sadly obvious at the annual luncheon of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, which brought together nearly 400 of the biggest movers and shakers in the Cuban-American community last week to hear all the Senate candidates. It's a tribute to PAC's clout that all four agreed to appear in the same room at the same time. They wouldn't debate or take questions, but it was still the most important moment yet in this young Senate campaign. A very good moment for one of the candidates (Marco Rubio), pretty good to fair for two others (Maurice Ferre and Kendrick Meek) and an awful one for Crist.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Each candidate spoke for five to seven minutes, giving everyone a chance to compare and contrast. And what a contrast it was.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Democrat Ferre read a well-crafted, thoughtful speech linking progress on human and civil rights in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> to any future <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> diplomatic overtures.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Fellow Democrat Meek pointed out that he has consistently voted against relaxing travel and trade with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, followed the advice of his three Cuban-American congressional colleagues and has the president's ear.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Eloquent paean to free <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Rubio delivered an eloquent and unscripted paean to a free <st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region> that had intellectual heft and emotional power, particularly his disdain for Americans willing to put on moral blinders in order to sell <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place> food and agricultural products .</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><b>That left Charlie, who got up and said sincerely -- his favored leitmotif -- that he loves freedom and hopes Cuba will one day be free and a ``shining city on a hill'' like the United States is to the world. Then he told the story of his grandfather, Adam Christodoulou, who came to this country from Greece at the age of 8, shined shoes, saved his money and became an American success story. </b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><b>It's a lovely story, although telling it over and over in political settings seems to both cheapen its value and aggrandize the teller. It certainly resonated with a roomful of Cuban immigrants, but I suspect the group at the Biltmore most wanted to hear the governor speak substantively about <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place> policy issues -- trade, travel, the embargo, freeing political prisoners and dealing with the Castros and their successors. From Crist, however, nary a word, only his hope that <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place> will one day be free. Inexplicably, the governor didn't refer to a set of talking points on <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place> that had been carefully prepared for him. ``He decided to ad lib for some reason,'' says one of the people who prepared the talking points for Crist. ``I don't know why.''</b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Key endorsement lost</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">More bad news for Crist was delivered the next day: Reps. Lincoln and Mario Diaz-Balart, arguably the two most popular Cuban-American politicians in <st1:place w:st="on">South Florida</st1:place>, had withdrawn their endorsement. ``He knows the reason why,'' was all that <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lincoln</st1:place></st1:city> would say publicly.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">One reason, I'm told, involves Crist ignoring <st1:city w:st="on">Lincoln</st1:city>'s recommendation for the appointment of a <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadsden</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">County</st1:placetype></st1:place> prosecutor to a local judgeship. Seems that prosecutor had mentored the congressman's son, Daniel, a law student at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Florida</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">State</st1:placetype></st1:place>.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">But there's more to it than pique over a rejected judicial appointment. <b>The Diaz-Balart brothers have a close relationship with Kendrick Meek, who has followed their lead and that of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen on <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Cuba</st1:country-region></st1:place>. The brothers were evidently feeling that by endorsing Crist they'd betrayed Meek, who sat on the sidelines instead of endorsing their Democratic opponents last year. So, the Diaz-Balarts met privately with Meek and his mother, former Congresswoman Carrie Meek, before the PAC luncheon and said they'll be sitting on the sidelines during the 2010 Senate race.</b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">They'd told Crist a few weeks earlier, but it took a call from Lincoln's top aide last week to get the Crist campaign to remove the Diaz-Balarts' names as endorsers from the governor's campaign website.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal">Crist can still win the GOP Senate nomination without Cuban-American votes, but it will be very hard. Harder yet if he doesn't win over, or win back, hard-core conservatives and mainstream Republicans who are gravitating toward Rubio. The latest poll shows them tied -- tied! -- at 43 percent in a race that was Crist's to lose. Unless he straightens up, toughens up and smartens up, he will.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://burnafterreading.nationaljournal.com/2010/03/why-are-florida-cubans.php?print=true">http://burnafterreading.nationaljournal.com/2010/03/why-are-florida-cubans.php?print=true</a></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />
</div>John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-83466997940006766272010-05-05T21:06:00.004-05:002010-05-05T21:27:47.551-05:00NCC CWS Letter to President re Religious TravelMay 4, 2010<br />
<br />
President Barack Obama<br />
The White House<br />
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW<br />
Washington, DC 20500<br />
<br />
Dear Mr. President:<br />
<br />
We uphold you, Mrs. Obama, and your family in our fervent prayers, with every good wish for the health of our nation and its leadership toward a more peaceful and just world.<br />
<br />
As leaders of Church World Service and the National Council of Churches in the USA, we write to you on behalf of our member communions to request that you end the restrictions on religious travel to Cuba. We appreciate your expressed willingness to review and revise long-standing U.S. policy toward Cuba and have<br />
welcomed your removal of restrictions on Cuban-American travel. We urgently ask that you now change the Cuba policy of the United States in ways that will assist the churches in their work and have wider benefits for our country and for the people of Cuba.<br />
<br />
Since 2005, U.S. church denominations, mission agencies and ecumenical organizations at the national and regional levels have suffered from severe restrictions on religious travel. Our institutions are currently eligible only for very limited licenses. Some of our institutions have been unable to secure even these limited licenses.<br />
<br />
In 2008 we addressed an earlier letter to you wherein we stated:<br />
<br />
<b>These impractical restrictions have reduced our ability to send religious delegations to Cuba, limited our opportunities to accompany and support our Cuban church partners, and have the effect of severely limiting participation in Cuba missions by many U.S. churches and congregants.</b><br />
<br />
Churches across the theological spectrum have called for the elimination of these restrictions which have now interrupted relationships, fellowship, and exchanges which began more than one hundred and twenty-five years ago.<br />
<br />
Insomuch that Congressional action is not required, we ask you to lift these restrictions. This is a matter of direct institutional importance to U.S. communions and religious institutions.<br />
<br />
Beyond this immediate step, we also ask that OFAC liberally grant visas for U.S. travel to Cuban pastors and other religious leaders; and, work closely with Congress to end the travel ban for all Americans. We are convinced that it is time to change this ineffective and counter-productive U.S. policy toward Cuba.<br />
<br />
Thank you for your considered attention to these concerns of the churches.<br />
<br />
Respectfully yours,<br />
<br />
Rev. Dr. Michael Kinnamon<br />
General Secretary<br />
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA<br />
<br />
Rev. John L. McCullough<br />
Executive Director and CEO<br />
Church World Service<br />
<br />
c/o Martin Shupack, Church World Service, 110 Maryland Ave., Suite 404, Washington, DC 20002 shupack@churchworldservice.org; 202-481-6934<br />
<br />
http://www.ncccusa.org/news/100505cubatravel.htmlJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-48314766652038922852010-04-19T21:47:00.000-05:002010-04-19T21:47:18.994-05:00Business Letter Supporting Ag and Travel LegislationApril 13, 2010<br />
<br />
The Honorable Collin C. Peterson<br />
U.S. House of Representatives<br />
2211 Rayburn House Office Building<br />
Washington, DC 20515-2307<br />
<br />
Re: H.R. 874, To Allow Travel Between the United States and Cuba<br />
<br />
Dear Congressman Peterson:<br />
<br />
We write to express our strong support for H.R. 874, which would remove restrictions on U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba.<br />
<br />
The United States should immediately remove travel restrictions and allow Americans to act as ambassadors of freedom and American values to Cuba. From farmers and manufacturers to human rights and religious groups, as well as a large and growing number of Cuban Americans,the American people recognize the unfairness and incongruity of restricting travel to Cuba. It is simply wrong that American citizens cannot travel freely to Cuba but are not restricted by the<br />
United States from traveling to places like North Korea and Iran.<br />
<br />
Current policies towards Cuba have clearly not achieved their objectives. Without the support of our allies and the larger international community, U.S. sanctions serve only to remove the positive influences that American businesses, workers, religious groups, students and tourists have in promoting U.S. values and human rights. Sanctions are also blunt instruments that generally harm the poorest people of the target country rather than that country’s leaders.<br />
<br />
This is certainly true of the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba. The United States continues to lose influence by voluntarily isolating its citizens from Cuba. Far from providing leverage, U.S. policies threaten to make the United States virtually irrelevant to the future of the island.<br />
<br />
We support the complete removal of all trade and travel restrictions on Cuba, and believe that Congress has a unique opportunity to take a step forward to end nearly 50 years of isolation from the Cuban people by passing H.R. 874. We urge your support for this important piece of legislation. Continuation of the status quo could leave the United States isolated from the Cuban people for another generation.<br />
<br />
Sincerely,<br />
<br />
AdvaMed<br />
Coalition of Service Industries<br />
Emergency Committee for American Trade<br />
Interactive Travel Services Association<br />
National Foreign Trade Council<br />
National Retail Federation<br />
Organization for International Investment<br />
U.S. Chamber of Commerce<br />
U.S. Council for International Business<br />
USA*EngageJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-76759945602956756842010-04-19T21:36:00.000-05:002010-04-19T21:36:33.838-05:00Rep. Mike Honda Op Ed Calling for End of EmbargoTime to lift the embargo on Cuba<br />
BY MICHAEL HONDA<br />
honda.house.gov<br />
<br />
Few know that Cuba, infamous for its socialism, cigars and salsa, was recently the United States' largest rice export market and is the fifth largest export market in Latin America for U.S. farm exports. Cuba holds $20 billion in trade with America over a three-year term. Our economy could benefit mightily from better relations, yet we alienate this potential ally.<br />
<br />
When I traveled to Cuba with a congressional delegation, it became clear that the embargo is imprudent politically, economically and socially. Everyone we met with -- U.S. and Cuban government officials, trade organizations, journalists, cultural attachés, foreign diplomats and rural farmers -- confirmed this point.<br />
<br />
Politically, now that Latin America stands beside Cuba -- as evidenced by diplomatic reinstatements with holdouts El Salvador and Costa Rica -- and the reintegration of Cuba into the Organization for American States and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CLACS) -- the United States risks ruinous relations with countries who see the blockade as backward. The United States is already marginalized: CLACS explicitly bars U.S. participation.<br />
<br />
The impact of this Latin tack towards insularity is not insignificant. Consider grandstanding by Brazil's President Lula da Silva, who rebuffed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's efforts to bring Brazil in on Iran sanctions while courting Cuba's leadership. Lula, capitalizing on Cuba's appetite for growth, proposed investments in industrial, agriculture and infrastructure projects, including ports and hotels, and an agreement with Brazil's oil company.<br />
<br />
We will see more of this. The Cubans are seeking suitors. Like the Bank of the South, Latin America's attempt to wean countries off U.S. institutions like the World Bank, the longer we keep Cuba at arm's length, the more likely Brazil and others will take our place. The longer we keep Cuba listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, an allegation roundly criticized by diplomats, the more we risk the credibility of our national security regime and reputation in the region.<br />
<br />
Economically, the case for cooperation is even clearer. Despite the trade embargo, there is some engagement. Cuba continues to be reliant on U.S. agriculture. Since 2002, we have been Cuba's largest supplier of food and agricultural products, with Cuba purchasing more than $3.2 billion worth of products since 2001.<br />
<br />
This agricultural reliance is in jeopardy, which puts American farmers at risk. In 2008, U.S. food imports to Cuba totaled $712 million, declined to $533 million last year and are declining this year. Cuba, having witnessed strong economic growth in the early 2000s at 11 and 13 percent, is now struggling to make ends meet, slipping below 2 percent in 2009. Beyond foodstuffs, other natural resources offer potential for partnership. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates nine billion barrels of oil are available in Cuba, plus an estimated nine billion cubic meters of natural gas. The Cuban government cites higher oil numbers, at 20 billion barrels. Either way, there's money to be made, and Cubans welcome participation. While the United States disengages, countries like Brazil, Russia, Venezuela and China are talking. We are clearly missing investment opportunities.<br />
<br />
Socially, Cubans emphatically embrace the cultural convergences between our countries. Their love of music, art, dance, history and architecture is ubiquitous, drawing 2.5 million tourists annually to Cuba, 800,000 of which are Canadian. If the travel ban was lifted, two million Americans are expected to travel there immediately, and ultimately growing to four million. This is hardly surprising. Havana retains the Caribbean's largest, oldest, and best-preserved Spanish colonial architecture. The city's charm is intoxicating.<br />
<br />
We should expand cooperation on education, medicine, science and sports through nonpolitical, people-to-people exchanges. The U.S. president has the authority to return the rules for academic, science, religious and other ``purposeful travel'' so that exchange can flourish again. This is how we rebuild relations.<br />
<br />
None of this negates the sobering negatives characterizing U.S.-Cuba relations. Cubans remain poor, irrespective of education (at nearly 100 percent literacy) and healthcare (everyone is covered, for everything). The government is inadequately serving the population, and there is a palpable, public rethink surfacing within society, from government officials to academics to farmers. Reform is coming, though not as soon as, or in the form, the United States prefers.<br />
<br />
America's annual $60 million in democracy-building, which is covertly distributed for explicitly stated regime change, exacerbates the problem by goading the government, jeopardizing the safety of reformers and marginalizing the U.S. Interests Section there. The American penchant for positioning Cuba-related communiqués as primarily human-rights reprimands resonates rankly as an inconsistent singling out.<br />
<br />
Amid the acrimony, the United States and Cuba are cautiously coordinating on areas of mutual interest, like migration, counter-narcotics and disaster preparedness. The United States must build on this sooner rather than later, before others opt in while we opt out.<br />
<br />
Cuba is not the enemy. She may frustrate the American proclivity for democracy promotion, but her behavior is nothing near as nefarious as U.S. allies elsewhere. The time to engage is now. Cubans are increasingly confabbing about reform while we sideline ourselves from the conversation.<br />
<br />
Michael Honda is a U.S. congressman from the 15th District in California.<br />
<br />
Read more: http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/04/13/v-fullstory/1577713/time-to-lift-the-embargo-on-cuba.html#ixzz0lbVZM0tVJohn McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-4760033369162368992010-04-12T15:33:00.002-05:002010-04-12T15:33:16.956-05:00Secretary of State at University of LouisvilleHillary Rodham Clinton<br />
Secretary of State<br />
University of Louisville<br />
Louisville, KY<br />
April 9, 2010<br />
<br />
<br />
QUESTION: Thank you, Senator Clinton. Given the fact that probably the Cuban missile crisis may be the greatest example of a deterrent, that’s been almost 50 years ago. Is there any talk within the Department of maybe normalizing relationships with Cuba?<br />
<br />
SECRETARY CLINTON: That’s a really – that’s a topic of conversation a lot. I don’t think that there is any question that, at some point, the people of Cuba should have democratically elected leaders and should have a chance to chart their own future. But unfortunately, I don’t see that happening while the Castros are still in charge. And so what President Obama has done is to create more space, more family travel, more business opportunities to sell our farm products or for our telecom companies to compete dealing with common issues that we have with Cuba like migration or drug trafficking. In fact, during the height of the terrible catastrophe in Haiti because of the earthquake, we actually helped some of the Cuban doctors get medical supplies who were already operating there.<br />
<br />
So there are ways in which we’re trying to enhance our cooperation. But it is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would then lose all of their excuses for what hasn’t happened in Cuba in the last 50 years. And I find that very sad, because there should be an opportunity for a transition to a full democracy in Cuba. And it’s going to happen at some point, but it may not happen anytime soon.<br />
<br />
And just – if you look at any opening to Cuba, you can almost chart how the Castro regime does something to try to stymie it. So back when my husband was president and he was willing to make overtures to Cuba and they were beginning to open some doors, Castro ordered the – his military to shoot down these two little unarmed planes that were dropping pamphlets on Cuba that came from Miami. And just recently, the Cubans arrested an American who was passing out information and helping elderly Cubans communicate through the internet, and they’ve thrown him in jail. And they recently let a Cuban prisoner die from a hunger strike. So it’s a dilemma.<br />
<br />
And I think for the first time, because we came in and said, look, we’re willing to talk and we’re willing to open up, and we saw the way the Cubans responded. For the first time, a lot of countries that have done nothing but berate the United States for our failure to be more open to Cuba have now started criticizing Cuba because they’re letting people die. They’re letting these hunger strikers die. They’ve got 200 political prisoners who are there for trivial reasons. And so I think that many in the world are starting to see what we have seen a long time, which is a very intransigent, entrenched regime that has stifled opportunity for the Cuban people, and I hope will begin to change and we’re open to changing with them, but I don’t know that that will happen before some more time goes by (Applause.)John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1030815107147841511.post-175201171378363222010-03-17T22:32:00.000-05:002010-03-17T22:32:02.043-05:00US, Cuban officials discuss Haiti quake assistanceUS, Cuban officials discuss Haiti quake assistance<br />
17 Mar 2010 23:40:07 GMT<br />
Source: Reuters<br />
* Meeting held at experts' conference in Santo Domingo<br />
<br />
* Cuba, U.S. involved in huge Haiti relief effort<br />
<br />
By Manuel Jimenez<br />
<br />
SANTO DOMINGO, March 17 (Reuters) - U.S. and Cuban officials met in the Dominican Republic on Wednesday to discuss international cooperation on assistance for Haiti after the catastrophic earthquake there, diplomats said.<br />
<br />
The meeting took place in Santo Domingo on the sidelines of an international conference of experts and officials from the Haitian government, donor nations, United Nations agencies and humanitarian groups to draft a reconstruction plan for the poor, quake-stricken Caribbean nation.<br />
<br />
The United States sent thousands of soldiers and aid workers to Haiti after the Jan. 12 earthquake, and Cuba sent hundreds of doctors and health personnel, all part of a huge international relief effort. Haiti says more than 300,000 people may have been killed in the catastrophe.<br />
<br />
Diplomats said Cheryl Mills, counselor and chief of staff to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and another senior State Department official, Julissa Reynoso, met in Santo Domingo with Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Rogelio Sierra and a senior Cuban Health Ministry official.<br />
<br />
Washington maintains a longstanding trade embargo against communist-ruled Cuba and nearly a half-century of hostile relations means that high-level meetings between the two countries are few and far between.<br />
<br />
The diplomats, who asked not to be named, said the U.S. and Cuban officials discussed aid for Haiti, including Cuba's capacity to help provide medical care for the hundreds of thousands of injured and homeless Haitian quake victims. More details of what they discussed were not immediately known.<br />
<br />
The U.S. delegation also held separate meetings with delegations from several other countries, including Venezuela, the diplomats said.<br />
<br />
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, like his ally Cuba, is a fierce critic of U.S. policies. Shortly after the quake, Chavez accused the United States of using the disaster as a pretext to occupy the devastated Caribbean country by sending troops. He recommended Washington should send doctors instead.<br />
<br />
Three days after the quake, U.S. officials announced the Cuban government had agreed to let the U.S. military use restricted Cuban air space for medical evacuation flights carrying Haitian victims, sharply reducing the flight time to Miami.<br />
<br />
Some analysts expressed hopes that this kind of U.S.-Cuban cooperation could lead to a thaw in frosty ties between Havana and Washington, which U.S. President Barack Obama said last year he would like to restore to a better footing.<br />
<br />
But the Feb. 23 death of a Cuban political prisoner on a hunger strike, and the continuing detention in Cuba of a U.S. contractor accused by Havana of distributing illegal communications equipment have stoked mutual criticisms between the two longtime ideological enemies.<br />
<br />
The experts meeting in Santo Domingo this week worked on a draft of a reconstruction plan for Haiti, whose leaders say $11.5 billion will be needed for recovery and rebuilding in what was already the Western Hemisphere's poorest state.<br />
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The plan will be presented for approval and funding at an international donors conference in New York on March 31. (Editing by Pascal Fletcher and Eric Beech)John McAuliffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02738853658043094283noreply@blogger.com0